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THE LIMITATIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN DISCLOSURE REGIMES 
 
Adam S. Chilton* & Galit A. Sarfaty† 
 
 
Although the past few decades have seen numerous cases of 
human rights violations within corporate supply chains, companies are 
frequently not held accountable for the abuses because there is a 
significant governance gap in the regulation of corporate activity abroad. 
In response, governments have begun to pass mandatory disclosure laws 
that require companies to release detailed information on their supply 
chains in the hopes that these laws will create pressure that will improve 
corporate accountability.  
In this paper, we argue that supply chain disclosure regimes are 
unlikely to have a large effect on consumer behavior, and as a result, 
their effectiveness at reducing human rights abuses will likely be limited. 
This is not only because scholarship on mandatory disclosure regimes in 
other areas has suggested that these regimes are frequently unsuccessful, 
but also because these problems are likely to be exacerbated in the 
human rights context. We argue that this is due to the fact that supply 
chain disclosures do not provide information on actual products, the 
information in the disclosures only provides weak proxies for human 
rights outcomes, and the risks associated with supply chains vary 
dramatically across industries.  
 In order to test our argument, we engaged a leading market 
research firm to field a series of experiments that were designed to test 
how well consumers understand supply chain disclosures. In our 
experiments, the nationally representative sample of respondents 
consistently rated disclosures reporting low levels of due diligence 
almost as highly as disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence. 
Based on these results, we argue that consumer-oriented supply chain 
disclosure regimes designed to improve corporate human rights behavior 
should be reconsidered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With the globalization of business, firms are increasingly relying 
on third-party suppliers in countries plagued by weak governance. 
Although this trend has provided economic benefits to workers in 
developing countries, recent tragedies—such as the collapse of the Rana 
Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh—have highlighted the potential of 
human rights violations occurring when firms outsource. 1  These 
tragedies have occurred, in part, because there is a significant governance 
gap with respect to the regulation of corporate activity abroad.2 
In an attempt to fill this gap, international legal instruments have 
been created over the past several decades to address the human rights 
conduct of transnational corporations.3 Most recently, the U.N. Human 
Rights Council unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights in 2011.4 The Guiding Principles affirm the 
corporate responsibility to protect human rights and outline remedies for 
victims of human rights abuses. 5  These principles, however, are 
voluntary and lack independent monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
As a result, although they are well intentioned, these principles and the 
other existing international standards have been ineffective in closing the 
governance gap. 
Given the shortcomings of international law, domestic legislation 
is emerging as an alternative method for regulating the extraterritorial 
human rights abuses of corporations. Within this shift to domestic law, 
governments are specifically turning to mandated disclosure as a way of 
filling the governance gap. Mandated disclosure regimes have gained 
traction, in part, because they are an indirect method of regulation that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Jim Yardley, Report on Deadly Factory Collapse in Bangladesh Finds 
Widespread Blame, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/ world/asia/report-on-bangladesh-building-
collapse-finds-widespread-blame.html.  
2 See, e.g., PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE 
(2014). 
3 Existing standards include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the 
U.N. Global Compact, and ISO 26000. See infra note 23. 
4 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding 
Principles on Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John 
Ruggie) [hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles]. 
5 Id. 
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faces less political resistance than other regulatory techniques.6  These 
regimes aim to shape corporate behavior by using transparency as a 
disinfectant.7 Recent disclosure regulations require companies to provide 
information on their global supply chains, including due diligence 
measures that they have undertaken to prevent human rights violations 
by third-party suppliers.  
Although several laws that mandate supply chain disclosures 
regarding human rights have been passed around the world, the first, and 
perhaps most important, such law is the California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act (CTSCA). 8  The CTSCA requires companies to 
disclose their efforts to ensure that their supply chains are free from 
slavery and human trafficking. The law affects millions of consumers, 
given that California represents the world’s seventh largest economy and 
the country’s largest consumer base.9 It has also served as the model for 
recent U.K. legislation on supply chain transparency and proposals for a 
similar law on the federal level in the United States and Australia.10  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Mandated disclosure is an example of a “new governance” regulatory 
mechanism that relies on specific, inflexible mandates to change behavior. New 
governance mechanisms stand in contrast to traditional command and control 
methods that are state-focused. The new governance model is considered to be 
more flexible, participatory, and cost-efficient, and may promote more 
innovation and tailoring to local circumstances. See generally Orly Lobel, The 
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Martha Minow, 
Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1229 (2003). For an application of new governance theory to international 
regulation, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening 
International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming 
the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 541 (2009). 
7 Id. 
8  See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 
1714.43(a)(1) (West 2012) [hereinafter CTSCA, S.B. 657]. Another prominent 
supply chain disclosure law currently in force is the Dodd-Frank Act’s section 
1502, under which companies must report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission on their suppliers’ use of conflict minerals. See Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 
Stat. 1376, 2213-18 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012)) 
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act § 1502]. 
9 See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY 
CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE (2015), available at 
http://www.calchamber.com/GovernmentRelations/BusinessIssues/Documents/
California-Transparency-in-Supply-Chains-Act-Resource-Guide.pdf [hereinafter 
Cal. Dep’t of Justice Resource Guide]. 
10  See U.K. Modern Slavery Act of 2015, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/contents/enacted; Business Supply 
Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2014, H.R. 3226, 
available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-
bill/3226/text/ih?overview=closed [hereinafter Business Supply Chain 
Transparency Act]. The Australian government has indicated a willingness to 
enact legislation similar to the CTSCA and convened a Supply Chains Working 
Group to assess regulatory options. See Commonwealth of Australia, Australian 
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The hope of these laws is that stakeholders will be better able to 
pressure companies to change their behavior if they have access to 
disclosed information. 11  For example, customers may consider 
information on a company’s level of due diligence when making their 
purchasing decisions. Activists and NGOs may use this information to 
exert reputational pressure as part of a campaign for better sourcing and 
human rights practices among companies. Investors may alter their 
investment choices on the basis of this information. Finally, the 
requirement of disclosing information may lead companies to change 
their behavior even without pressure being exerted by consumers, NGOs, 
or investors.   
Although supply chain disclosure laws could theoretically 
influence companies through any of these mechanisms, the laws have 
been specifically crafted to compel companies to provide information 
targeted to consumers who are making purchasing decisions.  For 
example, the CTSCA was intended to ensure that the content and format 
of the disclosures would be useful for consumers. 12  As a result, 
companies design their disclosures to provide information in a concise, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee report: Trading Lives: Modern Day Human 
Trafficking (Oct. 27, 2014), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representa
tives_committees?url=jfadt/slavery_people_trafficking/report.htm. 
11  See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4; Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, 
Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve 
Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 695 (2003); David Hess, Social 
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving 
Corporate Accountability Through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453 
(2007); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI 
and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 
257 (2001); Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Foreword: Making Sense of 
Information for Environmental Protection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1347 (2008); Lobel, 
supra note 4. 
12 See Cal. Dep’t of Justice Resource Guide, supra note 9, at i (“A recent law in 
California is poised to help California consumers make better and more 
informed purchasing choices. The California Transparency in Supply Chains 
Act (Steinberg, 2010) (the 'Act') provides consumers with critical information 
about the efforts that companies are undertaking to prevent and root out human 
trafficking and slavery in their product supply chains – whether here or 
overseas.”); id. at 1 ("The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which 
became effective on January 1, 2012, empowers California consumers to join 
the fight against human trafficking by giving them access to information about 
retailers’ and manufacturers’ efforts to eradicate such labor practices from their 
supply chains."); id. at 3 ("The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, 
which became effective on January 1, 2012, empowers California consumers to 
join the fight against human trafficking by giving them access to information 
about retailers’ and manufacturers’ efforts to eradicate such labor practices from 
their supply chains."); id. at 5 ("The Act is expressly intended to 'educate 
consumers on how to purchase goods produced by companies that responsibly 
manage their supply chains,' and therefore disclosures should be made in a 
manner that best serves this public policy.").  
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structured, and easy to read format. In other words, instead of providing 
the kind of comprehensive information that would be useful to activists 
or investors, the law was designed to provide information that could 
change consumer behavior.  
In this paper, we argue that supply chain disclosure regimes are 
unlikely to have their intended effect. In other words, we argue that they 
are unlikely to have a large effect on consumer behavior, and as a result, 
their effectiveness at reducing human rights abuses will likely be limited. 
Although hardly any research has been conducted to date on the 
effectiveness of supply chain disclosure regimes, supply chain practices 
are obviously not the only subject that governments are compelling 
companies to disclose about. Instead, supply chain laws are part of a 
growing body of disclosure regulations that have become ubiquitous in a 
variety of areas.13 But as this body of disclosure regulations has grown, 
so has an extensive literature empirically studying their effectiveness. 
This literature has largely challenged the value of mandated disclosures 
and has particularly questioned whether consumers in fact read and 
understand them.14  
Moreover, the problems that have limited the effectiveness of 
disclosure regimes are likely to be exacerbated in the context of supply 
chain disclosures. Our argument is that disclosures are not only unlikely 
to be read and understood generally, but there are also several specific 
features of human rights-related supply chain disclosure regimes that 
make them even less likely to be useful to consumers. Most notably, 
while most disclosures concern the quality of a firm’s product or service, 
supply chain disclosures provide information on the process by which a 
product was manufactured (in the case of the CTSCA, whether human 
trafficking and slavery may have been used in the production process). 
Moreover, human rights-related supply chain disclosures are likely to be 
uniquely difficult to interpret because they do not provide information on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); JAMES T. 
HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND 
IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM (2005); William M. 
Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health 
Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999). 
14 Some critics still see mandated disclosure as a promising tool if designed 
properly. See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEL, FULL 
DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007); Oren Bar-
Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L. 
REV. 93, 98 (2010); Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and 
How Not To Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333 (2013); 
Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of 
E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006); Daniel Schwarcz, 
Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance 
Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014). Yet others are more 
skeptical that this regulatory technique can be fixed. See BEN-SHAHAR & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 13; Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best 
Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389 (2010); Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: 
Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012).  
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the actual number of human rights abuses a company has committed. 
They instead only provide information on the level of due diligence 
companies conduct to minimize the risk of human rights violations in 
their supply chains. Finally, it is difficult for consumers and experts alike 
to assess the probability of human rights abuse in a given company’s 
supply chain because the levels of risk vary considerably based on a 
company’s size, industry, the country in which it operates, the number of 
tiers of suppliers in its supply chain, and the total number of suppliers. 
Taken together, these features of supply chain disclosures make them 
likely to be even less effective than disclosures in other contexts.  
In order to test our argument, we engaged a leading market 
research firm to recruit a nationally representative sample of respondents 
to complete a series of experimental tests designed to measure whether 
consumers are able to understand the contents of supply chain 
disclosures. In the primary experiment, we asked respondents to read a 
company’s disclosure and then rate the company’s likely commitment to 
eradicating slavery and human trafficking from its supply chain. For the 
experimental treatment, we randomly varied whether the disclosure 
reported a high level of supply chain due diligence (indicating that the 
company is undertaking a comprehensive effort to eradicate human 
rights violations from its supply chain) versus a low level (indicating 
little effort by the company to manage human rights risks within its 
supply chain). We further randomly varied whether the disclosure only 
provided the basic information that the law requires, or whether the 
disclosure went beyond compliance by conforming to the model 
disclosure guidelines that have been released by the state of California. 
In both our primary experiment and our additional experimental tests, the 
respondents consistently rated disclosures that either were completely 
non-compliant or reported low levels of due diligence almost as highly as 
disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence. These results give 
credence to our theory that it is unlikely that consumers will be able to 
differentiate between these disclosures sufficiently to pressure companies 
to reduce the risk of human rights abuses in their supply chains.  
It is important to note that our argument and experimental results 
only suggest that supply chain disclosures are unlikely to be understood 
and used by consumers making purchasing decisions. It is admittedly 
still possible that, even if the disclosures may not have the effect of 
changing consumers’ impressions of companies, they may instead 
provide information that can be used by advocates in public relations 
campaigns, lawsuits, or other forms of advocacy. In fact, consumer class 
action lawsuits have recently been filed against Nestlé and Costco based 
on claims of misleading and unfair business practices, which stems from 
the companies’ alleged failure to ensure that their CTSCA public 
disclosures accurately represent their human rights practices.15 Given the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The class action cases against Nestlé and Costco alleged forced labor in their 
supply chains and argued that the companies’ CTSCA statements on their 
websites were misleading as to their labor practices.  Both cases were recently 
dismissed for lack of standing, but the Nestlé case has been appealed to the 9th 
Circuit.  See Monica Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, et al., No. 15-3783, 
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potential of leveraging information in CTSCA disclosures to facilitate 
litigation, disclosures may have an effect unrelated to the way that 
consumers respond to and comprehend them. If these are the primary 
ways that supply chain disclosures are likely to have an effect, however, 
it would still call into question the existing regimes because they have 
focused on designing short disclosures directed at consumers and not the 
kind of comprehensive disclosures that would be most useful for 
developing a lawsuit.   
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the 
ineffectiveness of international law in regulating companies’ human 
rights practices as well as the rise of efforts to do so through mandated 
disclosure. We then describe the CTSCA and our findings of corporate 
compliance with and consumer awareness of this law. In Part II, we 
discuss the need to critically examine supply chain regulations in light of 
existing literature challenging the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure 
regimes in general. We then highlight the unique characteristics of 
human rights-related supply chain disclosures that suggest that they are 
even less likely to be effective than disclosure regimes in other contexts. 
In Part III, we present the results of our primary experiment designed to 
assess how supply chain disclosures influenced consumer confidence in 
corporate efforts to root out human trafficking and slavery. We then 
present the results of three additional experimental tests of how 
respondents reacted to supply chain disclosures. These tests measured: 
(1) the influence of disclosures on consumer comprehension; (2) 
consumer views on actual disclosures; and (3) the reported influence of 
disclosures on potential purchasing decisions. Finally, in Part IV, we 
discuss the implications of our results and argue that current supply chain 
disclosure laws should be reconsidered.  
 
 
I. TOWARDS SUPPLY CHAIN DISCLOSURE 	  
The tragic cases of corporate complicity in human rights 
violations abroad have given rise to calls for supply chain accountability. 
Advocates have pursued international law as a mechanism to regulate 
multinational corporations, thus giving rise to a host of international 
standards culminating in the recently approved U.N. Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights.16 Yet these voluntary standards have 
been ineffective in holding companies accountable for human rights 
abuses committed by their suppliers. Therefore, some advocates are now 
turning to domestic law—specifically mandated disclosure—as an 
alternative to international legal mechanisms. Recent legislation in the 
United States and United Kingdom requires companies to make 
disclosures on human rights due diligence conducted on their supply 
chains. The first and most prominent supply chain disclosure law aimed 
at consumers is the 2010 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
(CTSCA), which is the subject of our study.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
N.D. Calif.; order entered Jan. 15, 2016); Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., No. 15-
1364 (C.D. Cal., order entered Dec. 9, 2015). 
16 See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4. 
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A. The Ineffectiveness of International Law 
Scholars and policymakers have identified a governance gap 
with respect to the prevention of extraterritorial human rights abuses by 
multinational corporations.17 In the words of John Ruggie, U.N. Special 
Representative for Business and Human Rights:  
The root cause of the business and human rights 
predicament today lies in the governance gaps created by 
globalization—between the scope and impact of 
economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies 
to manage their adverse consequences. These 
governance gaps provide the permissive environment for 
wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without 
adequate sanctioning or reparation.18 	  
There is a governance gap in the reach of both national and international 
law, thus leaving companies not legally accountable for potential human 
rights violations. Closing this gap is therefore a critical challenge.   
The governance gap is particularly pronounced in conflict-
affected areas, where host states lack the political capacity, rule of law, 
and/or will to enforce human rights norms and provide redress to victims 
of human rights violations.19 Host states are primarily concerned with 
attracting foreign investment, which may mean turning a blind eye to 
domestic law violations or abstaining from passing human rights 
regulations that could lead companies to shift their business elsewhere 
(with fewer regulatory burdens).20 States in so-called “weak governance 
zones” are usually plagued by corruption and may be unable to prevent 
or stop human rights violations within their borders (and may sometimes 
be implicated in those violations themselves).21 
International law is a potential mechanism for closing the 
governance gap and regulating corporate human rights abuses abroad. 
Scholars have argued that companies have legal obligations under 
international law, particularly for violations of human rights, labor rights, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See, e.g., PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE 
(2014); Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 747 (2014). 
18 U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human 
Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie).  
19 See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4; see also Susan Marks, Empire’s 
Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 449, 461 (2003). 
20 See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 460, 463 (2001). 
21 See OECD, RISK AWARENESS TOOL FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN 
WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES (2006). 
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and environmental protection. 22  A range of intergovernmental 
mechanisms has emerged over the past several decades to address the 
human rights conduct of transnational corporations. Existing standards 
include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ILO’s 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights, the U.N. Global Compact, and ISO 26000.23 These standards 
have been influential in developing new norms and setting expectations 
for companies, many of which have responded by adopting internal 
codes of conduct and compliance systems on human rights.24 
The most recent and highly publicized international mechanism 
is the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding 
Principles), which were unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Human 
Rights Council in 2011.25 The Guiding Principles, which are the result of 
extensive, multi-year consultations, have become the dominant 
framework for articulating the international law landscape with respect to 
business and human rights. The Guiding Principles rest on three pillars: 
(1) the state duty to protect human rights; (2) the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights; and (3) the need for access to remedies for 
victims of human rights abuses.26 While the Guiding Principles assign 
states the primary duty to protect against corporate human rights abuses, 
they also urge companies to undertake a regular process of human rights 
due diligence whereby human rights abuses are treated as critical 
business risks. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS (2006); José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International 
Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1 (2011); Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, 
Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339 (2001); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to 
Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at 
International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931 (2004); Ratner, supra note 20. 
23  See OECD, The OECD Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises: Text, 
Commentary and Clarifications, DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL (Oct. 31, 
2001); International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, (4th ed. 2006), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf; Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights (2000), available at 
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles/; United 
Nations, UN Global Compact (2000), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html; 
Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO 26000: Guidance on Social Responsibility 
(2010), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42546. 
For further discussion of these international legal mechanisms, see SIMONS & 
MACKLIN, supra note 17. 
24 See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 22; Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational 
Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
389 (2004-2005). 
25 See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4. 
26 Id. 
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The Guiding Principles define the parameters of corporate due 
diligence, which is aimed at identifying, preventing, mitigating, and 
accounting for potential adverse human rights impacts.27 According to 
the Guiding Principles, the process of conducting due diligence should 
be ongoing throughout the life of an activity, include all internationally 
recognized human rights as a reference point, and extend to a company’s 
suppliers.28 Companies are expected to “seek to prevent or mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, 
products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not 
contributed to those impacts.”29 Business relationships are understood to 
include relationships with “entities in [a company’s] value chain.”30 The 
Guiding Principles further call on states to encourage, or where 
appropriate require, reporting by companies of their due diligence 
measures to prevent adverse human rights impacts.31 
Building on the recent approval of the Guiding Principles, there 
is a process underway to develop a U.N. treaty on business and human 
rights.32 According to its proponents, a treaty could provide victims with 
access to justice remedies that are not outlined in the Guiding Principles 
and create binding obligations on corporations.33 There has been broad 
support in the NGO community for such a treaty, with more than 600 
civil society organizations having signed a joint statement in 2013 calling 
for a binding international legal framework to protect against corporate 
human rights abuses.34 In June 2014, the U.N. Human Rights Council 
passed a resolution to create an open-ended intergovernmental working 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4, at Principles 17–21. 
28 Id. at Principles 17, 18 cmt. 
29 Id. at Principle 13(b). 
30 Id. at Principle 13(b) cmt. 
31  Id. at Principle 3 cmt. The commentary states: “A requirement to 
communicate can be particularly appropriate where the nature of business 
operations or operating contexts pose a significant risk to human rights. Policies 
or laws in this area can usefully clarify what and how businesses should 
communicate, helping to ensure both the accessibility and accuracy of 
communications.” Id. 
32 For a discussion of options for a new international legal instrument on 
business and human rights, see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, NEEDS 
AND OPTIONS FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT IN THE FIELD OF 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2014), available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/NeedsandOptionsinternationalinstICJRepo
rtFinalelecvers.compressed.pdf. 
33 See SURYA DEVA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: 
HUMANIZING BUSINESS (2012). 
34 Joint Statement: Call for an International Legally Binding Instrument on 
Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
(2013), available at http://www.treatymovement.com/statement-2013. 
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group to propose an international treaty.35 A new expert legal group is 
currently conducting consultations over the next two years to inform the 
treaty process, which commenced in July 2015.36 The next step will be to 
articulate options for the treaty, including whether it would only focus on 
gross human rights violations, and whether it would apply to only 
transnational corporations or also apply to state-owned firms, national 
companies, joint ventures, and subsidiaries.37 
Despite the development of multiple intergovernmental 
standards on business and human rights as well as the movement for a 
binding treaty, international law remains an ineffective mechanism for 
regulating corporate human rights abuses abroad. Existing standards 
have the status of voluntary soft law and lack independent monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms.38 This includes the Guiding Principles, 
which many civil society organizations and advocates have criticized as 
deficient in many respects.39 For instance, the Guiding Principles do not 
call on home states to enact extraterritorial legislation. The Commentary 
to the Guiding Principles states:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally 
binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
with respect to human rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1.  
36 The two-year treaty initiative is led by the International Federation for Human 
Rights (FIDH) and The Corporate Accountability Working Group of the 
International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net). 
See https://www.escr-net.org/node/365893. 
37  See John G. Ruggie, Life in the Global Public Domain: Response to 
Commentaries on the UN Guiding Principles and the Proposed Treaty on 
Business and Human Rights (2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2554726. 
38 See SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 17; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 22, at 
958–60; John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving 
International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007). 
39 See Joint Civil Society, Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, January 2011, available at 
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Joint_CSO_Statement_on_GPs.pdf. For further 
background and critiques of the Guiding Principles, see Larry Catá Backer, 
Moving Forward the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: 
Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the Treaty 
Law That Might Bind Them All, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457 (2015); Robert C. 
Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 
TEXAS INT’L L.J. 33 (2012); Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between Responsibility 
and Accountability, 14 J. HUMAN RIGHTS 237 (2015); Florian Wettstein, CSR 
and the Debate on Business and Human Rights, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739 (2012); 
David Weissbrodt, Human Rights Standards Concerning Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Entities, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 135 (2014); 
Cindy S. Woods, It Isn’t a State Problem: The Minas Conga Mine Controversy 
and the Need for Binding International Obligations on Corporate Actors, 46 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 629 (2014–2015). 
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At present States are not generally required under 
international human rights law to regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their 
territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally 
prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized 
jurisdictional basis.40 
 
Even though the Guiding Principles recognize the “significant 
legal gap[s]” in home state practice with respect to regulating corporate 
human rights abuses, they only place a minimal burden on host states. 
Moreover, despite calls to articulate legal duties for corporations under 
international law, the Guiding Principles stop short of taking this step. As 
the introduction to the Guiding Principles affirms, “nothing in these 
Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law 
obligations.”41   
While the treaty process has gained momentum, it has also been 
subject to substantial criticism. 42  The aforementioned 2014 U.N. 
resolution, sponsored by Ecuador and South Africa, only garnered a 
plurality, not a majority, of votes in the Council. The opposing countries 
included the United States, all states in the European Union, Japan, and 
Korea; there were also 13 abstentions. State opposition to the resolution 
reflects the lack of broad political support for this endeavor.43 It thus 
remains unclear whether the treaty process will result in an instrument 
that will garner approval by the U.N. Human Rights Council, and how 
long such a process may take. As a result, there is a risk that states will 
use this delay as an excuse for not implementing the Guiding 
Principles.44 In addition, negotiations to achieve consensus on a treaty 
may result in an instrument that is too vague to provide effective 
guidance. 45  In the absence of a U.N. treaty, the international law 
landscape consists only of voluntary soft law standards, thus creating 
pressure for home states to address corporate human rights abuses abroad. 
B. The Rise of Domestic Disclosure Laws 
Given the limitations of existing international legal mechanisms, 
domestic law is emerging as a potential tool for regulating the 
extraterritorial human rights abuses of multinational corporations. Home 
states are beginning to exert pressure on corporations to abide by 
international human rights norms abroad, particularly in light of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4, at 3–4.  
41 Id. at 1. 
42 See Backer, supra note 39, at 530. 
43 See Erika R. George, Incorporating Rights: Making the Most of the Meantime 
(2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560082. 
44 See John Tasioulas, Human Rights, No Dogmas: The UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights 3 (2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561420. 
45 Id. 
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inability of host states to effectively govern companies that conduct 
business within their borders. Since the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
limited the exterritorial application of the Alien Tort Claims Act,46 
advocates are pursuing mandatory information disclosure laws as an 
alternative mechanism to promote corporate accountability.  
Supply chain disclosure laws require companies to report on 
their efforts to address human rights violations in their supply chains. 
This “new governance” regulatory technique is less intrusive than one 
that imposes direct standards, and therefore faces less political 
resistance.47 For example, a supply chain disclosure law may require 
companies to provide information on whether they use third party 
auditors to verify the labor practices of their suppliers. While failure to 
report under these regulations may carry penalties, information 
disclosure laws largely operate through non-coercive enforcement, by 
facilitating pressure on companies by consumers, NGOs, and investors.48  
One example of an issue that supply chain disclosure laws have 
addressed is the use of conflict minerals. The first legislation in this area 
was section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which imposes a new reporting 
requirement on publicly traded companies that manufacture or contract 
to manufacture products using certain conflict minerals.49 The stated 
rationale behind the law is that by curbing the illegitimate exploitation of 
natural resources by state and non-state armed groups, it will indirectly 
hinder financing of the ongoing conflicts in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).  
Under section 1502, companies must disclose whether they 
source minerals originated in the DRC and bordering countries on a new 
form to be filed with the SEC (Form SD for specialized disclosures).50 If 
a company does source minerals from the DRC and bordering countries, 
it must also submit a Conflict Minerals Report on due diligence measures 
taken to determine whether those conflict minerals directly or indirectly 
financed or benefited armed groups in the covered countries.51 The 
quality of the due diligence must meet nationally or internationally 
recognized standards, such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). The Alien 
Tort Claims Act allows U.S. district courts to hear “any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 
1350 (1789).  
47 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
48 Id. 
49 Dodd-Frank Act § 1502. While section 1502 was passed in 2010 as part of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC issued a final rule in 2012 following a long public 
comment period. 
50 For an analysis of the first set of Conflict Minerals Reports filed with the SEC 
as well as further discussion of section 1502, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light 
on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419 (2015). 
51 Id. 
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Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and 
High-Risk Areas.52 
One important feature of section 1502 is that because it requires 
an SEC filing, it imposes penalties on companies for not reporting or 
complying in good faith.53 Form SD is deemed filed under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and subject to section 18 of the Exchange Act, 
which attaches liability for any false or misleading statements.54 Section 
1502 also has a public disclosure requirement on company websites, 
which facilitates third-party rankings and the leveraging of consumer, 
NGO, and investor pressure on companies to become conflict-free.55 
It is important to note that the United States is not the only 
country that has begun to use supply chain disclosure laws to limit the 
use of conflict minerals. In February 2012, the DRC passed a law 
requiring all mining and mineral trading companies operating in the 
country to undertake due diligence on all levels of their supply chain 
according to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains.56 In Canada, a conflict minerals act was introduced in the House 
of Commons in 2013 that would require Canadian companies to exercise 
due diligence in sourcing minerals from the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa, also in accordance with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.57  
Additionally, in late May 2015, the European Parliament 
endorsed a mandatory regulation on the responsible sourcing of minerals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (2d ed. 2013), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264185050-en; see also Conflict Minerals, 77 
Fed. Reg. 56274, 56281–82.  
53 See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56280. 
54 Id. 
55 There are already various consumer applications that track sustainability 
issues including conflict minerals policies. See, e.g., RANKABRAND, 
www.rankabrand.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); GOODGUIDE, 
www.goodguide.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). In addition, the Enough Project 
has published a ranking of electronics companies in 2010 and 2012 based on a 
survey of their conflict minerals policies and performance. See Enough Project, 
Conflict Minerals Company Rankings, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO (2015), 
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals-company-rankings. 
56 See MINISTERE DES MINES DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO, 
ARRETE MINISTERIEL N.0057.CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2012: PORTANT MISE EN 
ŒUVRE DU MECANISME REGIONAL DE CERTIFICATION DE LA CONFERENCE 
INTERNATIONALE SUR LA REGION DES GRANDS-LACS « CIRGL » EN 
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO, Article 8, available at http://mines-
rdc.cd/fr/documents/Arrete_0057_2012.pdf; see also Press Release, Global 
Witness, Congo Government Enforces Law to Curb Conflict Mineral Trade 
(May 21, 2012), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/ 
files/library/Congo_government_enforces_law_to_curb_conflict_minerals_trade
.pdf. 
57 Conflict Minerals Act, H.C. C-486, 41st Parl. (Can.) (2013), available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6062040&Fil
e=4.  
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from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.58 The proposed law, which is 
estimated to affect over 800,000 European companies, would require 
companies to disclose the steps they have taken to address risks in their 
supply chains for conflict minerals. As compared to section 1502, the 
European regulation would have a broader geographic scope, as it would 
apply to conflict minerals sourced in all conflict-affected or high-risk 
areas (not just in the DRC region). In addition, the European law would 
apply not only to manufacturers but also to downstream companies 
(those that purchase from the smelter or refiner). Finally, the regulation 
includes a mandatory certification program involving independent third-
party audits for smelters and refiners and establishes a “European 
responsible importer” label for importers that comply with the 
regulation. 59  The labeling component highlights the law’s focus on 
consumers: “[conflict] minerals, potentially present in consumer products, 
link consumers to conflicts outside the [European] Union. As such, 
consumers are indirectly linked to conflicts that have severe impacts on 
human rights.” 60  The European Parliament will next engage in 
negotiations with European member states on the text of the proposed 
regulation, which will need final approval from the European Council to 
become law. 
C. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
Supply chain disclosure laws such as section 1502 of Dodd-
Frank have not only required companies to make disclosures to investors 
on conflict minerals, but have also begun to require companies to make 
disclosures directly to consumers on human rights more broadly. The 
first, and most ambitious, of these laws is the 2010 California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA).  
 
1. Requirements. — The CTSCA is an anti-human trafficking 
law that targets the corporate supply chain and imposes disclosure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See Press Release, European Parliament News, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Ask 
for Mandatory Certification of EU Importers (May 20, 2015), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150513IPR55318/html/Conflict-minerals-MEPs-ask-for-
mandatory-certification-of-EU-importers. The European Parliament voted to 
reject the European Commission’s proposal for a voluntary system of self-
certification. 
59  See also European Parliament Votes for Tougher Measures on Conflict 
Minerals, THE GUARDIAN (May 21, 2015), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/may/21/european-
parliament-tougher-measures-conflict-minerals. 
60 See Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Setting up a Union 
System for Supply Chain Due Diligence Self-Certification of Responsible 
Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, their Ores, and Gold Originating in 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Apr. 24, 2015), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-
2015-0141&language=EN#title2. 
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requirements on multinational firms that took effect January 1, 2012. 
Under the CTSCA, companies are required to post disclosures if they 
meet three criteria. The company must be a “[1] retail seller and 
manufacturer [2] doing business in this state [of California] and [3] 
having annual worldwide gross receipts that exceed one hundred million 
dollars ($100,000,000).”61 
The CTSCA requires companies that meet these three criteria to 
disclose their efforts to ensure that their supply chains are free from 
slavery and human trafficking.62 It outlines five topics that companies 
must report on their websites regarding their supply chain due diligence: 
verification, 63  audits, 64  certification, 65  internal accountability, 66  and 
training.67   
 As an information disclosure law, the CTSCA does not require 
companies to implement any new measures or ensure that their supply 
chains are free from human trafficking or slavery. It simply requires 
disclosure on a company’s website of its efforts to eradicate human 
rights violations in its supply chain. Corporate statements must be 
accessible through a “conspicuous and easily understood link,” with the 
goal of helping consumers make informed purchasing decisions.68 Third 
parties are already beginning to compile this information in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 CTSCA, S.B. 657, supra note 8, at section 3. 
62 Id.  
63 Verification: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail 
seller or manufacturer… [e]ngages in verification of product supply chains to 
evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and slavery. The disclosure shall 
specify if the verification was not conducted by a third party.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 
1714.43, subd. (c)(1). 
64 Audits: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail seller 
or manufacturer… [c]onducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier 
compliance with company standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains. 
The disclosure shall specify if the verification was not an independent, 
unannounced audit.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 1714.43, subd. (c)(2). 
65 Certification: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail 
seller or manufacturer… [r]equires direct suppliers to certify that materials 
incorporated into the product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human 
trafficking of the country or countries in which they are doing business.” Cal. 
Civ. Code, § 1714.43, subd. (c)(3). 
66 Accountability: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the 
retail seller or manufacturer… [m]aintains internal accountability standards and 
procedures for employees or contractors failing to meet company standards 
regarding slavery and trafficking.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 1714.43, subd. (c)(4). 
67 Training: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail 
seller or manufacturer… [p]rovides company employees and management, who 
have direct responsibility for supply chain management, training on human 
trafficking and slavery, particularly with respect to mitigating risks within the 
supply chains of products.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 1714.43, subd. (c)(5). 
68 CTSCA, S.B. 657, supra note 8.  
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more effectively reach consumers.69 The only remedy for failure to 
comply with the law is an action brought by the Attorney General of 
California for injunctive relief. 
 
2. Compliance. — Since the Attorney General of California has 
not yet brought actions against companies for failing to comply with the 
CTSCA, 70  it is an open question whether companies actually have 
compiled with the requirements of the law. In order to analyze regulator 
compliance with the CTSCA, we compiled a dataset of whether 
companies that met the law’s criteria have posted supply chain 
disclosures. Our dataset is based on information available as of June 
2015. 
To identify companies that meet these criteria, we relied on a 
database compiled by KnowTheChain. This non-profit organization “was 
created to educate companies, investors, policymakers, and consumers 
about the existence of slavery in supply chains, and to encourage greater 
disclosure and transparency related to [the CTSCA].”71 As part of that 
mission, KnowTheChain has attempted to develop a list of companies 
that meet the criteria to make a disclosure under the CTSCA.72  
There are 501 companies on KnowTheChain’s list of companies 
that are required to make disclosures under the CTSCA.73 To build our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 For instance, KnowTheChain has compiled a dataset that checks whether 
applicable companies posted statements that addressed at least three of the five 
statutory requirements. See About Us, KNOWTHECHAIN, 
https://www.knowthechain.org/about-us/  
70 Although no actions have thus far been brought by the Attorney General of 
California, in April 2015, the Office of the Attorney General sent informational 
letters to companies that are required to comply with the legislation but had not 
yet posted disclosure statements on their websites. It also issued a consumer 
alert on the legislation and created an online form to report suspected violations. 
See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of California, Attorney 
General Kamala D. Harris Issues Consumer Alert on California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act (Apr. 13, 2015), available at 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/consumer-alert.pdf?. 
71 See KNOWTHECHAIN, supra note 69. 
72 To develop its list of companies that are required to make a disclosure under 
the CTSCA, KnowTheChain used a three-wave process. First, a research team 
used criteria developed by an outside law firm to search the Hoovers D&B 
database for companies that met the CTSCA’s criteria. Second, a different group 
of researchers used the Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database to identify 
additional companies that meet the CTSCA’s criteria. Third, KnowTheChain 
also included a “small number of additional companies” that its research team 
discovered had already made disclosures in the list of companies required to do 
so. See KNOWTHECHAIN, supra note 69.  
73 KnowTheChain occasionally updates its database. This number is based on 
the number of companies included on May 1, 2015. This list, however, may be 
both under- and over-inclusive. The list is probably under-inclusive because 
many companies required to make disclosures are not easily identifiable using 
public databases. Moreover, the list is possibly over-inclusive because there may 
be a few companies that voluntarily made disclosures even though they did not 
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dataset, we independently collected data on each of these 501 companies. 
For each of these companies, we first attempted to determine whether 
they have posted a CTSCA disclosure. For each company that had a 
statement available, we then coded information about the length, content, 
and visibility of its statement. 
Figure 1 displays the percentage of companies that have a 
statement on their website out of those identified by KnowTheChain as 
being required by the CTSCA to file a disclosure. As the Figure shows, 
79.2% (397 out of 501) have a CTSCA disclosure posted, and 20.8% 
(104 out of 501) do not.  
 
Figure 1: Companies With CTSCA Disclosures Posted 
	   	  	  
 
Although roughly a fifth of companies have still not complied 
with the CTSCA, it does appear that compliance has increased over time. 
KnowTheChain reports that when it launched in October 2013, 71% of 
required companies had posted a CTSCA disclosure. 74  To increase 
compliance, in January 2014 KnowTheChain and the Business and 
Human Rights Resource Center began trying to contact companies that 
had not yet made disclosures.75 Of the 129 companies they contacted, 44 
companies responded to their communications (and 85 did not). 76 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
meet all three criteria (although we believe this to be a handful of companies at 
the very most). 
74  See Humanity United, KnowTheChain: Mixed Corporate Response to 
California’s Transparency Law (Feb. 12, 2014), available at 
https://humanityunited.org/knowthechain-mixed-corporate-response-to-
californias-transparency-law/; Humanity United, Announcing 
KnowTheChain.org (Oct. 21, 2013), available at 
http://archive.humanityunited.org/blog/announcing-
knowthechainorg#.Vd0JSZ1Viko.  
75  See Humanity United, KnowTheChain: Mixed Corporate Response to 
California’s Transparency Law, supra note 74. 
76 Id.  
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Although this response rate is low, the targeted communication efforts 
may have contributed to the increase in compliance between when 
KnowTheChain began checking for disclosures in 2013 and our efforts to 
check statements in the summer of 2015.  
For each of the 397 disclosures that we were able to locate, we 
coded their contents for compliance with the CTSCA. Specifically, the 
CTSCA identifies five topics that companies are required to discuss in 
their disclosures. 77  We specifically coded whether each of the 397 
disclosures reported on the five requirements. Figure 2 presents data on 
the number of topics that were covered in our dataset of disclosures.  
 
Figure 2: Number of Topics Covered in CTSCA Disclosures 
 
As Figure 2 shows, there were 10 companies that posted a 
CTSCA disclosure, but did not adequately discuss a single one of the 
topics the law requires for companies to disclose. Instead, these 
companies posted more general statements on their efforts to avoid 
human trafficking and slavery.78 Additionally, there were a number of 
companies that posted disclosures, but did not address all of the required 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 For a general overview of the requirements of the CTSCA, see Cal. Dep’t of 
Justice Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
78 For example, CarMax posted the following statement on its website: “CarMax 
recognizes the serious nature of the crimes of human trafficking and slavery. 
CarMax has taken and will take every reasonable effort to ensure that its supply 
chain is free of products that are tainted by human trafficking. Because all of the 
vehicles sold by CarMax in California are used vehicles, and all of the 
replacement parts CarMax uses in its reconditioning process are purchased from 
other retailers, CarMax believes that it has taken all necessary steps to audit and 
reasonably mitigate the risk that its products are tainted by the crimes of human 
trafficking and slavery.” See CarMax Terms of Use, Required California 
Disclosure: CA Supply Chain Transparency, available at 
http://www.carmax.com/enus/legal-notice/default.html#CA-supply-chain-
transparency (last visited August 25, 2015).  
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topics: 10 companies addressed one topic; 16 companies addressed two 
topics; 34 companies addressed three topics; and 68 companies 
addressed four topics. In total, 34.8% of the companies that filed 
disclosures did not discuss all five required topics.  
Roughly two-thirds of companies that filed disclosures, however, 
addressed all five of the required topics. More specifically, 259 
companies—65.2% of those that posted disclosures—addressed all five 
required topics. However, since the law requires all five topics to be 
discussed, all companies that did not do so are in non-compliance with 
the CTSCA. This suggests that only a bare majority of companies that 
KnowTheChain identified as being required to file a disclosure have 
posted one discussing all five of the topics required by the CTSCA: just 
52% of companies (259 out of 501) have met this burden.79  
 
3. Awareness. — One notable feature of the CTSCA is that it is 
designed to present information directly to potential consumers. As a 
result, it is worth evaluating potential consumer awareness and interest in 
CTSCA disclosures. In an effort to do so, we administered a survey to a 
nationally representative sample of respondents that explored consumer 
awareness of the CTSCA. In the survey, we asked respondents two 
questions designed to measure their familiarity with the CTSCA: (1) 
whether respondents were aware of the CTSCA,80 and (2) whether they 
could correctly identify the purpose of the CTSCA.81  
Figure 3 reports the results of these questions. As the left panel 
reveals, a reasonably large percentage of our respondents claimed to 
have heard of the CTSCA. More specifically, 25% of respondents 
reported that they had heard of the CTSCA. As the right panel reveals, 
however, only 10% of respondents correctly answered that the purpose 
of the CTSCA is to provide information on efforts to prevent and root 
out human trafficking and slavery. To put this in to perspective, if the 
respondents were guessing between the seven answer choices randomly, 
they should have guessed the correct answer 14% of the time.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 It is worth noting that instead of requiring all five topics to be discussed, 
KnowTheChain has elected to identify companies as compliant with the 
requirements of the CTSCA if they discuss 3 out of 5 of the required topics.  
80 We specifically asked: “Have you heard of the ‘California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act?’” 
81 We specifically asked: “Which of the following pieces of information do you 
think the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act requires companies to 
disclose?” We then offered respondents seven answers to choose from: (1) How 
the company is ensuring that all of its suppliers comply with safety standards; 
(2) Efforts the company is undertaking to prevent human trafficking in its supply 
chain; (3) Whether the company uses conflict minerals in its supply chain; (4) 
Steps the company is taking to reduce its carbon emissions; (5) none of the 
above; (6) all of the above; and (7) not sure. To reduce the influence of ordering 
effects, the order of the first four options was randomized.  
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Figure 3: Reported Awareness of the CTSCA 
 
 
 
That said, these results likely overstate levels of awareness of the 
CTSCA for two reasons. First, our survey was administered online, and 
respondents could have taken the time to Google the CTSCA in another 
window. Second, many of the respondents that correctly answered the 
question about the purpose of the CTSCA had also reported having 
previously not heard of the CTSCA. In fact, only 6% of our respondents 
reported having heard of the CTSCA and could correctly identify its 
purpose.82  
 
4. Other Examples. — The CTSCA has served as a model for the 
transparency in supply chains provision of the U.K.’s Modern Slavery 
Act (which was enacted in March 2015 and took effect in October 2015), 
as well as the proposed U.S. Business Supply Chain Transparency on 
Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015. 83  The U.K.’s disclosure 
requirement is broadly applicable to all companies that supply goods or 
services to any part of the country and have turnover of at least £36 
million.84 Thus, it is not limited to U.K. entities or entities with their 
primary place of business in the United Kingdom. Companies subject to 
the U.K. Modern Slavery Act have to prepare a slavery and human 
trafficking statement each financial year on efforts they have taken to 
ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not taking place in their 
supply chains. As in the CTSCA, there is no affirmative obligation on 
companies to rid their supply chains of slavery and human trafficking; 
only a requirement to disclose any supply chain due diligence that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 To be exact, 87 out of 1,421 respondents reported having heard of the CTSCA 
and could correctly identify its purpose.  
83  See U.K. Modern Slavery Act, supra note 10; Business Supply Chain 
Transparency Act, supra note 10.  
84 U.K. Modern Slavery Act, supra note 10. 
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have undertaken.85 Companies must post their statements on a prominent 
place on their websites, thus highlighting the law’s intended goal of 
generating consumer pressure to motivate corporate performance.86 
While the United States has yet to pass a similar law, a proposed 
bill has been introduced several times in Congress: in 2011, 2014, and 
most recently in July 2015. If passed, this bill would apply to all publicly 
traded and private companies currently required to submit annual reports 
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (not just retailers 
and manufacturers doing business in California), as long as those 
companies have annual worldwide gross receipts exceeding $100 
million.87 These companies would be required to disclose their efforts to 
identify and address specific human rights risks in their supply chains: 
forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and the worst forms of child 
labor.88 Companies would have to disclose the required information on 
their websites (“through a conspicuous and easily understandable 
link”).89 The proposed bill would also require companies to file annual 
reports with the SEC, as is currently required under the conflict minerals 
provision in the Dodd-Frank Act’s section 1502.90  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Additionally, as in the CTSCA, the U.K. Modern Slavery Bill does not 
contain penalties but leaves open the possibility that the Secretary of State can 
bring civil proceedings in the High Court for an injunction or, in Scotland, for 
specific performance of a statutory duty to ensure compliance. Id. The U.K. 
government has released guidance on its transparency in supply chains provision 
in response to consultations with a wide range of stakeholders. See U.K. HOME 
OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ETC.: A PRACTICE GUIDE (2015), 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4
71996/Transparency_in_Supply_Chains_etc__A_practical_guide__final_.pdf; 
see also U.K. Home Office, Modern Slavery and Supply Chains Government 
Response: Summary of Consultation Responses and Next Steps (2015), 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4
48200/Consultation_Government_Response__final__2_pdf.pdf. 
86 According to the act, “if the organization does not have a website, it must 
provide a copy of the slavery and human trafficking statement to anyone who 
makes a written request for one, and must do so before the end of the period of 
30 days beginning with the day on which the request is received.” U.K. Modern 
Slavery Act, supra note 10.  
87 Business Supply Chain Transparency Act, supra note 10, at § 4. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See Business Supply Chain Transparency Act, supra note 10; Dodd-Frank Act 
§ 1502.  
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II. THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE REGIMES 
 
Disclosure laws operate under the assumption that transparency 
will lead to accountability. In the case of supply chain disclosure regimes, 
the primary goal of these laws is to pressure companies to conduct a high 
level of due diligence on their suppliers, with the ultimate aim of 
preventing labor rights violations abroad. In an ideal world, disclosures 
would help to achieve this goal by allowing the public (including 
consumers and investors) to make more informed decisions that would 
drive companies to change their behavior.91 Yet is that what happens in 
practice?  
Scholars have analyzed the value of mandated disclosure in a 
variety of regulatory areas. Existing literature calls into question the 
value of this regulatory tool and suggests a limited set of conditions 
under which more “targeted transparency” initiatives could work.92 Yet 
there is little research on supply chain disclosures directed at 
consumers.93Given the unique characteristics that distinguish human 
rights-related supply chain disclosures, we argue that they are even less 
likely to be effective than disclosure regimes in other contexts. Based on 
our discussion, we describe what methods can be used to empirically test 
the effectiveness of existing supply chain disclosure regimes. 
 
A. Scholarship on the Effectiveness of Disclosures 
Mandated disclosure has become ubiquitous in a variety of 
regulatory areas, including privacy policies, informed consent in health 
care, and consumer protection in banking.94  Given the relative ease of 
enacting mandated disclosure as compared to more direct and intrusive 
techniques, this tool has become “the principal regulatory answer to 
some of the principal policy questions of recent decades.”95 Yet recent 
literature has questioned the effectiveness of disclosure regimes given 
their reported failures to achieve their purported goals.96 The most acute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Richard Craswell distinguishes between these two “static” and “dynamic” 
purposes of disclosures. See Craswell, supra note 14. 
92 See sources cited supra note 14. 
93 But see Sarfaty, supra note 50 (empirically studying compliance with section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act).   
94 Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider discuss the reasons for the ubiquity of 
mandated disclosure—it appeals to lawmakers because it looks cheap, easy, and 
effective despite empirical evidence that may suggest otherwise. See BEN-
SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13. 
95 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 4. 
96 Critics have also highlighted limitations of disclosure regimes from the 
perspective of the firms that disclose.  For instance, it is unclear whether 
disclosers can accurately ascertain what information they need to reveal under 
regulations, can locate and assemble the requisite data, and can effectively 
present that information to best reach consumers. See BEN-SHAHAR & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 13. 
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criticisms are aimed at the perspective of consumers.97 A significant 
body of literature has focused on whether the public reads, understands, 
or trusts disclosures, and whether they use those disclosures to enhance 
their decision-making. 
In fact, scholars have demonstrated that consumers frequently do 
not read disclosures, or at best skim them.98 For instance, one study 
found that only one or two out of every thousand retail software shoppers 
actually read end user license agreements (“the fine print”) online.99  In 
other words, almost all online shoppers have not read the terms that they 
have agreed to. Aside from issues of illiteracy, disclosures may be 
unreadable because of an “overload problem” whereby disclosures are 
too complex and copious for consumers to handle.100 Another reason that 
the public may not read disclosures is because of an “accumulation 
problem” whereby consumers are confronted with so much information 
from so many disclosures that it is difficult for them to remember, 
interpret, and apply that information.101 In other words, more information 
is not always better.  
Even if consumers do read disclosures, critics contend that the 
public frequently does not understand them and incorporates little (if 
any) of the information into decisions. Disclosures are generally written 
at a college level and often fail to describe complex information in 
simple terms.102 Moreover, consumers’ psychological biases may shape 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 691–98 (2011). 
98 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer 
Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the 
“Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009); 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94 (2012). 
99 See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does 
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 
43 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2014). As a result of the low readership among buyers, there 
is a concern in the context of contracts that sellers will impose unfair and one-
sided terms. See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 98; see also Alan Schwartz & 
Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979); Michael Spence, 
Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. OF 
ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).  
100 See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
101 See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 8–9; OREN BAR-GILL, 
SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER 
MARKETS 36-37 (2012); Eugene G. Chewning, Jr. & Adrian M. Harrell, The 
Effect of Information Load on Decision Makers’ Cue Utilization Levels and 
Decision Quality in a Financial Distress Decision Task, 15 ACCT. ORG. & 
SOC’Y 527, 539-40 (1990); Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Effects of 
Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 200, 211-12 (1987); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information 
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 
417 (2003). 
102 See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 8.  
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how they perceive disclosures and ultimately how those disclosures 
shape their activity.103 For instance, a study of credit card disclosures 
reveals that consumers often have imperfect self-control and 
underestimate the likelihood of future adverse events, which makes them 
unable to factor in all of the relevant costs of credit card borrowing in 
disclosed terms.104 Because people often misperceive, misinterpret, and 
misuse disclosures, it is difficult for policymakers to predict whether 
disclosures will be used appropriately. Finally, the public may not trust 
the disclosers that release information.  There is a fear among some 
consumers that a company disclosing information “has managed to 
exploit imperfections in the measuring system, thus making its own 
brand look better than it really is.”105 
Yet these limitations do not necessarily mean that mandated 
disclosure is a completely ineffective regulatory technique or, worse, 
harmful given the costs it imposes on firms that disclose. Scholars have 
emphasized that a key factor for determining success is how disclosures 
are designed and executed, keeping in mind the distinctive goals of each 
disclosure law.106 Success here is defined as changing firms’ behavior by 
impacting their decision-making calculus through, for instance, 
consumer, investor, or NGO pressure. 107  The effectiveness of a 
disclosure in achieving this success thus may depend on “the length, 
format, and type of terms that are disclosed, as well as the setting in 
which it is presented.”108   
B. The Unique Difficulties of Human Rights Disclosures 
While there is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of 
mandated disclosure, little research has addressed the growing body of 
laws that require companies to disclose information about their supply 
chain in the hopes of improving human rights outcomes. It is our 
argument that, even if companies complied with these regulations, there 
are at least three features of human rights-related supply chain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and 
Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33 (2006); Jill E. Fisch & Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An 
Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605 (2014); Xavier 
Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and 
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505 (2006); 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2014). 
104 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW U. L. REV. (2004).  
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Product-Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure, 14 AM. L. & 
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107 Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 402. 
108 Joshua Mitts, How Much Mandatory Disclosure Is Effective? (Oct. 4, 2014), 
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disclosures that suggest that they are less likely to be effective than 
disclosure regimes in other contexts: (1) the disclosures discuss 
production processes and not product characteristics; (2) the information 
they provide is difficult to interpret because they are only proxies for the 
probability of human rights abuses; and (3) the regimes ignore the 
considerable heterogeneity among companies with regard to the 
probability of risk, which complicates comparisons across disclosures. 
First, although mandatory disclosures typically require 
companies to provide information on features of their products or 
services, human rights-related disclosures are unique in that they require 
companies to provide information on the process by which a product was 
made. For instance, a law may mandate credit card companies to disclose 
information about the quality of their products, such as the interest rates 
they charge. In contrast, supply chain disclosure regimes do not require 
companies to provide information about their products’ characteristics; 
they instead require companies to disclose whether the processes used to 
manufacture their products are likely to allow for human rights abuses.  
In other words, if a consumer were deciding whether to buy a 
pair of jeans manufactured by Company A or Company B, a human 
rights-related supply chain disclosure would not tell the consumer 
anything about the durability of the fabric or the quality of the stitching. 
Instead, the disclosure would inform the consumer, for instance, as to 
whether Company A or B hired third party auditors to assess potential 
human rights violations in the factory where the jeans had been sown. 
Since the physical characteristics of the two pairs of jeans would remain 
the same even if one product were made without using child labor while 
another product was manufactured using child labor,109 the disclosure 
regime would only be effective if consumers were willing to change their 
purchasing decisions on the basis of an intangible benefit (e.g., 
supporting the human rights of employees who manufactured that 
product).  
Of course, supply chain disclosure regimes are not the only 
regulations that require companies to provide information on their 
product processes. For example, other disclosure regulations that cover 
non-product characteristics include environmental disclosures relating to 
the sustainability of the production process (but that do not affect their 
safety) and those that describe animal well-being in the production 
process. Since existing literature on the limits of mandated disclosure 
focuses on disclosures that do affect the quality of a firm’s product or 
service, human rights disclosures represent largely unchartered territory 
where we believe the effects are going to be even more attenuated.  
Second, human rights-related supply chain disclosures are likely 
to be less effective than other disclosures because they are uniquely 
difficult to interpret. Supply chain disclosures do not provide information 
on the actual number of human rights abuses a company has committed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 In international trade, this characteristic is referred to as a “non-product-
related process and production method,” which does not render products as 
“unlike.” In addition to the issue of human rights in a product’s supply chain, 
another characteristic that falls under this category is the environmental footprint 
of a product. 
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Instead, they provide information on the level of due diligence conducted 
by companies to minimize the risk of human rights violations in their 
supply chains. These disclosure regimes thus operate under the 
assumption that due diligence efforts are reliable proxies for human 
rights outcomes. 
The disclosures are difficult for consumers to interpret, however, 
because it is unclear to what extent these proxies actually reveal the 
probability that a company’s suppliers will actually conduct human 
rights abuses. In fact, it is unclear whether even experts can make 
reliable conclusions about the risk of human rights violations in 
corporate supply chains based on their disclosures. In the case of 
disclosures under the CTSCA, do consumers have the expertise to extract 
an overall risk profile for a company based on information on 
verification, audits, certification, internal accountability, and training? Is 
a company that uses third party auditors but does not have human rights 
training more or less likely to use suppliers that commit human rights 
abuses than a company that uses internal audits but does provide human 
rights training? Therefore, even if companies post supply chain 
disclosures and consumers take the time to read them, it is not clear that 
consumers will know how to interpret the information.  
Third, when assessing the probability of human rights abuses in 
a given company’s supply chain, one must recognize that the levels of 
risk vary considerably based on a company’s size, industry, the country 
in which it operates, the number of tiers of suppliers in its supply chain, 
and the total number of suppliers. Existing scholarship has empirically 
demonstrated that repeated audits are not the key predictor of workplace 
compliance with labor standards; rather, other factors such as the local 
institutional context (in particular, the strength of state regulatory 
institutions and the strength of local civil society) are more directly 
linked to effective compliance.110 Consumers are typically unaware of 
the multiple variables that impact a company’s risk profile, particularly 
given that supply chain laws such as the CTSCA impose the same 
requirements for companies that operate in different industries and 
geographic areas. Therefore, it is difficult for consumers to rely solely on 
these disclosures to draw conclusions about the underlying human rights 
risks within a company’s supply chain.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See Greg Distelhorst et al., Production Goes Global, Compliance Stays 
Local: Private Regulation in the Global Electronics Industry, 9 REG. & GOV. 
224 (2015); see also RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE 
POWER: PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013); GAY 
W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
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Working Conditions, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 193 (2015); Richard M. 
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Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike; 61 IND. LABOR 
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C. Assessing the Effectiveness of Supply Chain Disclosures 
Taken together, we believe that the three issues raised in the last 
section are likely to limit the effectiveness of laws that seek to reduce 
human rights violations by requiring companies to post information 
about their supply chain due diligence efforts. However, we are unaware 
of any efforts to date to empirically test the effectiveness of these 
regimes. Although academics and NGOs have evaluated whether 
companies have complied with disclosure requirements, these studies 
have not tested the effect that these disclosures have on either consumer 
or corporate behavior.111  
Obviously, policy makers, scholars, and advocates are eager to 
know whether these laws will ultimately lead to fewer violations of 
human rights. Unfortunately, though, directly testing the effectiveness of 
these laws in producing positive human rights outcomes is 
complicated—if not impossible—for a number of reasons. First, a great 
deal of the data that would be required for this analysis is not publicly 
available. For example, data on the web traffic to companies’ disclosures 
are not publically available, and, most importantly, the kind of micro-
level data of human rights abuses that would be required to conduct such 
a study is currently not available. Second, since companies are not forced 
to post supply chain disclosures (even though they are legally required to 
do so), it is likely the case that the decision to post the disclosures is 
endogenous to human rights practices. In other words, if only those 
companies that prioritize eradicating human rights abuses post 
disclosures, even research that found companies that post supply chain 
disclosures to be less likely to use suppliers that engage in human rights 
abuses would not demonstrate that it was due to the disclosure.  
Despite these obstacles, it is worth trying to find alternative ways 
to empirically assess the effectiveness of these regimes. Given the 
difficulty of using observational research methods, one can use 
experimental methods to empirically assess whether the policy in 
question can lead to reductions in human rights abuses.112 For corporate 
human rights disclosures, the primary justification for requiring 
companies to post disclosures is to provide consumers with information 
that can shape their purchasing decisions, and in doing so, pressure 
companies to change their behavior. It is thus possible to gain some 
traction on the question of whether these laws are effective by studying 
whether consumers understand and change their opinions based on the 
information provided in supply chain disclosures.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See, e.g., Chris N. Bayer, Corporate Compliance with the Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act of 2010 (Nov. 2, 2015), available at 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/f0f801_0276d7c94ebe453f8648b91dd35898ba.pdf; 
Know The Chain, Five Years of the California Transparency in Supply Chains 
Act (Sept. 30, 2015), available at https://www.knowthechain.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/KnowTheChain_InsightsBrief_093015.pdf. 
112 For a defense of using experimental methods to test the effectiveness of laws 
aimed at improving human rights, see Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why The 
Study of International Law Needs Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 172 
(2013).  
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  In an effort to assess the potential effectiveness of supply chain 
disclosure regimes, we designed a series of experimental tests to evaluate 
how consumers understand and interpret supply chain disclosures. We 
designed our experiments to specifically test the effectiveness of the 
recently passed California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA). 
We chose to do so because it is the first supply chain disclosure law 
around human rights that was directed at consumers. Given that 
California represents the world’s seventh largest economy and the 
country’s largest consumer base, this law has the potential to have a 
significant impact.113 Moreover, scholars have found a “California effect” 
whereby other state regulations and eventually federal law have ratcheted 
up standards to match stricter California laws.114 Since disclosures are 
posted to company websites, consumers across the country (and the 
world) now have access to information on corporate human rights 
practices and can make purchasing decisions that do not “inadvertently 
promote the crime of trafficking.”115 
 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENTS 
 
To better understand how individuals process and understand 
supply chain disclosures, we embedded several experiments in a survey 
administered to a nationally representative sample of respondents. In this 
Part, we first discuss the motivation behind our experimental assessment 
of supply chain disclosure regimes. Second, we discuss the sample that 
we recruited for our study. Third, we present the results of our primary 
experiment designed to assess how supply chain disclosures influenced 
consumer confidence in corporate efforts to root out human trafficking 
and slavery. Finally, we present the results of three additional 
experimental tests of how respondents reacted to supply chain 
disclosures: (1) the influence of disclosures on comprehension; (2) 
consumer views on actual disclosures; and (3) the reported influence of 
disclosures on potential purchasing decisions. 
A. Motivation 
We designed our experiments to test several aspects of how 
consumers understand and respond to the kind of supply chain 
disclosures that are required by the CTSCA. First, we designed our 
experiments to test whether information on the topics required to be 
disclosed improves consumer confidence in corporate efforts to root out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See Cal. Dep’t of Justice Resource Guide, supra note 9, at i. California’s 
Franchise Tax Board estimates that approximately 1,700 companies are likely 
subject to the law. Id. at 3. 
114 For a discussion of the “California effect” as applied to the history of 
American automobile emission standards, see DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: 
CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(1995). 
115 CAL. ATTY. GEN., THE STATE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN CALIFORNIA: 2012 
(2012), at 90. 
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human trafficking and slavery. As previously noted, the CTSCA requires 
companies to discuss five specific topics in their disclosures.116 It is not 
obvious, however, that consumers equipped with information on these 
five topics have greater confidence in corporate efforts to root out human 
rights violations as compared to consumers that are provided general 
statements on a company’s commitment to human rights.  
 Second, we designed our experiments to test whether consumers 
have greater confidence in disclosures that report a high level of due 
diligence among companies (indicating a comprehensive effort to 
eradicate human rights violations from its supply chain), as compared 
to disclosures that report a low level of supply chain due diligence. 
Although the CTSCA requires companies to reveal their practices on five 
specific topics, it does not require companies to actually adopt specific 
policies on those topics. For example, the CTSCA requires companies to 
discuss whether a third party verifies their supply chains, but it does not 
require companies to have a third party verify their supply chains. Thus, 
the CTSCA aims to shape corporate behavior by providing information 
to consumers so that they can reward companies that take efforts to 
eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their supply chain and 
punish companies that fail to do so. In light of this goal, it is important to 
test whether consumers can in fact tell the difference between disclosures 
that make optimal versus minimal efforts to mitigate human rights risks 
within their supply chains. 
 Third, we designed our experiments to test the effectiveness of 
“best practice” disclosures. Although the CTSCA requires companies to 
make disclosures on five topics, the amount of information that 
companies are required to provide on each of these topics is fairly 
minimal. That said, the California Attorney General’s office encourages 
companies to make “best practice” disclosures that provide more 
comprehensive information on each topic.117 In order to facilitate this 
goal, the California Attorney General’s office has released guidelines 
outlining the additional information that it recommends companies 
provide.118 Our experiment was designed to test whether following these 
guidelines (1) improves consumer confidence and (2) makes it easier for 
consumers to distinguish between companies that report comprehensive 
efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking and those that report 
only minimal efforts.  
 Fourth, we designed our experiments to test how well consumers 
comprehend the relevant information contained within supply chain 
disclosures. The CTSCA attempts to motivate companies to release 
disclosures that will be easy for consumers to understand. It is not clear, 
however, that the format that the CTSCA requires of companies 
improves consumers’ ability to understand the content of the disclosures. 
It is instead possible that the required format of the disclosures obscures 
the relevant information, and in doing so, makes it difficult for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 See supra text accompanying notes 63–67. 
117 See Cal. Dep’t of Justice Resource Guide, supra note 9. 
118 Id.  
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consumers to evaluate the due diligence practices and policies of a given 
company.  
 Finally, we designed our experiments to test the reported effect 
that the supply chain disclosures would have on potential future 
purchasing decisions. Of course, what we would ideally like to know is 
whether consumers are more (or less) likely to buy products from 
companies with supply chain disclosures that report better (or worse) due 
diligence practices. Since we are unable to directly observe future 
purchasing decisions, however, we can only evaluate the effect that the 
quality of disclosures has on claimed willingness to pay for products or 
services.119  
 
B. Subject Recruitment 
 
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Our Sample 
 # 
in Sample 
% 
of Sample 
% of U.S. 
Population 
Gender    
     Male 685 48% 48% 
     Female 736 52% 52% 
Age    
     18-24 206 14% 13% 
     25-34 264 19% 18% 
     35-44 254 18% 18% 
     45-54 239 17% 19% 
     55-64 241 17% 16% 
     65+ 216 15% 17% 
Race/Ethnicity    
     White 1,030 72% 69% 
     Hispanic 129 13% 9% 
     Black 166 12% 11% 
     Asian 67 5% 4% 
     Other 27 2% 2% 
Region    
     Northeast 265 19% 18% 
     Midwest 312 22% 22% 
     South 527 37% 37% 
     West 313 22% 23% 
 
Our sample was recruited by Survey Sampling International 
(SSI).120 SSI is a leading market research firm that primarily conducts 
research for corporate clients, but that also works with academic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 For examples of studies that also focus on willingness to pay, see, e.g.,  
Matthew Kugler & Lior Strahilevitz, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to 
Consumers?, JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming 2016).  
120 For more information, see https://www.surveysampling.com/ (last visited 
February 27, 2015).  
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researchers. We specifically engaged SSI to recruit a nationally 
representative sample of respondents to complete a survey that we 
designed. The sample SSI recruited was nationally representative of the 
U.S. adult population based on gender, age, race/ethnicity, and census 
region. Our survey was administered online to 1,421 respondents during 
the week of February 15–19, 2016. Table 1 provides a demographic 
breakdown of our sample compared to the U.S. adult population.  
C. Primary Experiment 
1. Research Design. — For our primary experiment, we asked 
each of our respondents to read one disclosure. We began by informing 
our respondents that “[t]he following questions are about company 
disclosures. We will describe one disclosure posted on a company's 
website. We will then ask for your thoughts on the disclosure. Thank you 
for taking the time to answer these carefully!” 
 After being displayed this prompt, on the following screen the 
respondents were randomly presented with one of five different supply 
chain disclosures.121 Those five disclosures were: (1) a general statement 
on the company’s commitment to human rights that did not discuss the 
five topics required by the CTSCA (“General Statement”); (2) a basic 
disclosure that suggested that the company was engaging in optimal 
efforts for each of the five topics required by the CTSCA (“Basic – 
Optimal”); (3) a basic disclosure that suggested that the company was 
engaging in minimal efforts for each of the five topics required by the 
CTSCA (“Basic – Minimal”); (4) a best practice disclosure that 
suggested that the company was engaging in optimal efforts for each of 
the five topics required by the CTSCA (“Best Practice – Optimal”); and 
(5) a best practice disclosure that suggested that the company was 
engaging in minimal efforts for each of the five topics required by the 
CTSCA (“Best Practice – Minimal”). 
 The General Statement was taken from the CTSCA Resource 
Guide produced by the California Attorney General’s office (the 
“resource guide”). 122  The resource guide specifically notes that “a 
general statement opposing human rights violations, while well-
intentioned, does not suffice because it does not address the five areas 
outlined in the statute.”123  The general statement that we used was 
included in the resource guide as an example of such a general statement 
that was inadequate. The statement that we used as an experimental 
treatment specifically reads: 
Our company is committed to respecting the human 
rights of our employees. Our Code of Ethics and 
company policies adhere to the principles of free choice 
 of employment, nondiscrimination, and humane 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Appendix A provides the exact text of the five disclosures used in our 
experiment.  
122 See Cal. Dep’t of Justice Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 22. 
123 Id.  
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treatment. We ensure compliance with regulations 
governing child labor, minimum wage, and maximum 
working hour limitations.124 
 The templates for the Basic and Best Practice disclosures used in 
our other four treatments were also based on materials in the resource 
guide. For each of the five topics required by the CTSCA, the resource 
guide offers examples of basic disclosures that provide the minimum 
information required for compliance, and best practice disclosures that 
provide more detailed information with “depth and context” to better 
educate consumers on corporate activities.125 Our two basic disclosures 
and our two best practice disclosures were drawn from examples for all 
five topics from the resource guide. As an illustration, Table 2 provides 
the text of the basic and best practice disclosures that we used for the 
“Certification” topic. According to the resource guide, a best practice 
disclosure under the “Certification” topic “explain[s] any additional 
efforts [companies] make to encourage their direct suppliers to comply 
with labor and anti-trafficking laws.”126  Such additional efforts that 
should be reported in best practice disclosures include “what records [a 
company] requires suppliers to maintain to support their certification.” 
Table 2: Example Disclosures on Supply Chain “Certification” 
Basic 
Disclosure 
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they 
comply with anti-slavery and human trafficking laws in 
the country or countries in which they do business.  
Best Practice 
Disclosure 
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they 
comply with anti-slavery and human trafficking laws in 
the country or countries in which they do business. Our 
partners must produce records to our company. Such 
records include: (1) proof of age for every worker; (2) 
every employee’s payroll records and timesheets; (3) 
written documentation of terms and conditions of 
employment; (4) local health and safety evaluations or 
documentation of exemption from law; and (5) records 
of employee grievances and suggestions, and any 
employer responses. 
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Table 3: Differences between Optimal and Minimal Policies 
 Optimal  Minimal  
Verification 
 
  
  -- # of Suppliers Audited 
 
• all direct 
suppliers 
• a sample of 
direct suppliers 
 
  -- Frequency of Audits • once a year • (no mention) 
 
  -- Use of a Third Party • third-party 
auditors  
• internal auditors 
 
Supplier Audits 
 
  
 -- Frequency of Audits • third-party 
auditors 
 
• internal auditors 
 -- Announcement of Audits • unannounced 
audits 
 
• announced audits 
 
 -- Number of Suppliers • all direct 
suppliers 
• a sample of 
direct suppliers 
 
Certification 
 
  
  -- Policy on Certification • require suppliers 
to certify 
• request suppliers 
to certify 
 
Internal Accountability 
 
 
  -- Result of a Supplier’s 
Failure to Take Action on 
Non-Compliance 
• termination of 
relationship with 
supplier 
 
• (no mention of 
consequence) 
Training 
 
  
  -- Topic of Training  • mitigating risks 
of human 
trafficking and 
slavery within 
the company’s 
supply chains 
 
• importance of 
respecting 
human rights 
 
 
In addition to randomly varying whether the disclosures we 
presented to readers were basic or best practice, we also randomly varied 
whether the disclosures reported the use of optimal efforts or minimal 
efforts to mitigate human rights risks within supply chains. For example, 
for the “Certification” topic, companies must disclose if they require 
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suppliers to certify “that materials incorporated into the product comply 
with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country or 
countries in which they are doing business.” 127  By implication, an 
optimal effort is one that requires suppliers to certify that they comply 
with the anti-trafficking laws of the countries in which they do business, 
while a minimal effort is one that does not require suppliers to certify 
that they comply with these laws. For each of the five topics, similar 
requirements exist. For our “optimal” disclosures, the companies 
reported engaging in optimal efforts for each of the five topics. For our 
minimal disclosures, the companies reported engaging in minimal efforts 
for each of the five topics. Table 3 presents the policies reported in the 
optimal and minimal disclosures. On the left-hand column is the area or 
areas of differentiation within each topic. 
 After being randomly presented with one of the five supply chain 
disclosures, we asked each respondent the following question: “On a 
scale of 0 (not at all committed) to 100 (extremely committed), how 
confident do you feel that this company is making an effort to prevent 
and root out slavery and human trafficking in its supply chain?”  
 
2. Results. — Figure 4 reports the results of our primary 
experiment. 128  The dots represent the mean response and the lines 
represent the 95% confidence interval for each of the five treatment 
groups. Dots further to the left (or right) represent less (or more) 
confidence in the hypothetical company’s efforts to eradicate slavery and 
human trafficking in its supply chain.  
 
 
Figure 4: Primary Experimental Results 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Cal. Civ. Code, § 1714.43, subd. (c)(3). 
128 Appendix B provides tables that report the results presented in Figures 4 - 7.  
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 The results in Figure 4 produce several important insights. First, 
and most notably, the average responses for all of the disclosures fell in a 
narrow range. On a scale of 0 to 100, all five disclosures scored within a 
10-point range: the Best Practice – Optimal disclosure received an 
average score of 75, and the Basic Practice – Minimal disclosure 
received an average score of 65. Moreover, the disclosure that was 
completely non-compliant (the General Statement) scored only 2 points 
lower than a disclosure that was “optimal” (the Basic – Optimal 
Disclosure).129  
 Second, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether the 
mandated format of CTSCA disclosures—that is, including the five 
required topics—improves consumer confidence compared to more 
general disclosures that report a company’s broad commitment to human 
rights. To test this, one of the disclosures used as a treatment was a 
general statement that the California Attorney General’s office 
specifically indicated as not covering the topics required by the CTSCA. 
The mean response for respondents given the General Statement was 67 
(95% CI: 65, 70). The mean responses for both groups that were given 
the basic compliant statements were comparable. The mean response for 
the participants that were given the Basic – Optimal disclosure was 69 
(95% CI: 67, 72) and the mean response for the Basic – Minimal 
disclosure was 65 (95% CI: 62, 68). The difference between the General 
Statement and these two treatments was not statistically significant. 
These results illustrate that a company that minimally complies with the 
CTSCA does not garner more confidence from consumers than a 
company that issues a general (non-compliant) statement on its 
commitment to respecting the human rights of its employees.  
 Third, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether 
consumers are likely to have greater confidence in companies that make 
optimal efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking in their supply 
chains, as compared to those that make minimal efforts to do so. To test 
this, our treatments included examples of disclosures reporting that 
companies were engaging in optimal and minimal efforts for each of the 
topics required by the CTSCA. The results in Figure 4 reveal that for 
both the basic and best practice disclosures, the participants reported 
higher levels of confidence in response to the “optimal” disclosures. For 
the basic disclosure, however, the difference is substantively small and 
far from statistically significant. This suggests that companies that report 
comprehensive efforts to mitigate human rights risks within their supply 
chains are not necessarily perceived better by consumers as compared to 
companies that report only minimal efforts. 
 Fourth, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether 
disclosures following the best practice guidelines promulgated by the 
State of California: (1) improve consumer confidence, and (2) make it 
easier for consumers to tell the difference between a company that 
reports that it undertakes comprehensive supply due diligence and one 
that reports minimal efforts to mitigate human rights risks in its supply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 The General Statement received an average score of 67; the Basic – Optimal 
Disclosure received an average score of 69.  
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chain. The results presented in Figure 4 suggest that the respondents that 
are given the Best Practice – Optimal disclosure report a higher level of 
confidence as compared to all the other treatments in a statistically 
significant way. Moreover, the gap between the Best Practice – Optimal 
treatment and the Best Practice – Minimal treatment is greater than the 
gap between the two basic treatments. That said, it is slightly troubling 
that the Basic – Optimal and Best Practice – Minimal disclosures score 
almost exactly the same (69 and 67, respectively) on a 100-point scale. In 
other words, if a company conducting a low level of due diligence 
simply frames its policies in the best practice format, it would potentially 
receive as much credit from consumers as a company with a high level of 
due diligence that does not adhere to the best practice (longer and more 
detailed) model.  
D. Additional Experimental Tests 
 In addition to the primary experiment reported in the previous 
section, our survey also included three other experimental tests of how 
respondents reacted to supply chain disclosures. In this section, we report 
the results of each of these tests.  
 
1. Influence of Disclosures on Comprehension. — In addition to 
testing how the disclosures influenced consumer confidence, we also 
wanted to know how well the respondents comprehended the disclosures. 
As a result, after the respondents were asked a few unrelated 
demographic questions, we then asked the respondents five questions 
about the content of the disclosures.  
 
Table 4: Comprehension Questions 
Auditor Identity Who did it say conducted the audits?  
Audit Frequency How often are the audits conducted? 
Notice How much warning are suppliers given before the audits occur?  
Training What did it say the company provides training on?  
Conflict Minerals What did it say the company is doing to make sure conflict minerals are not used in its supply chain? 
 
Table 4 lists the five comprehension questions that we posed to 
our respondents. To eliminate the possibility of any ordering effects, 
these five questions were presented in random order. For each of the five 
questions, we presented respondents with four answer choices. One of 
the four answer choices for each question was that the disclosure did not 
mention the topic.  
It is important to note that the correct answer was not the same 
for all of the treatment groups. For example, for the respondents that 
received the General Statement, it was correct to answer all five 
questions by saying that the disclosure did not mention the topic. As 
another example, for the respondents that received the Optimal 
treatments it was correct to say that “A Third Party” conducted the audits, 
but for the respondents that received the Minimal treatments it was 
correct to say that “An Internal Team of Auditors” conducted the audits.  
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Figure 5 presents the mean number (and 95% confidence 
interval) of comprehension questions that the respondents in each of the 
treatment groups answered correctly. The results are noteworthy in two 
particular ways. 
 
 
Figure 5: Comprehension Questions Correctly Answered 
 
 
First, the respondents that received the General Statement 
disclosure correctly answered the most questions: 2.88 (95% CI: 2.70, 
3.60). As previously noted, this is perhaps unsurprising because the 
correct answer for each question for respondents that received this 
treatment was that the disclosure did not mention the topic. Notice, 
however, that respondents that were presented with just this short 
statement still provided on average an incorrect answer 2 out of 5 times.  
Second, the respondents that received the Basic Statement – 
Optimal disclosure answered more questions correctly than the 
respondents that received either of the Best Practice treatments. These 
differences were both highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). The 
respondents that received this treatment answered 2.39 (95% CI: 2.25, 
2.53) questions correct, compared to 1.87 (90% CI: 1.76, 1.97) for the 
Best Practice – Optimal treatment and 1.54 (90% CI: 1.42, 1.65) for 
respondents that received the Best Practice – Minimal treatment. In other 
words, the recipients of the Best Practice treatment knew less about the 
content of the treatments than respondents that received a basic 
disclosure. This result suggests that the best practice guidance 
promulgated by the California government is not achieving its intended 
result of enhancing consumer comprehension.  
 
2. Views on Actual Disclosures. — One concern with our 
primary experiment is that we asked respondents to evaluate artificial 
disclosures that we designed for our study. It would be reasonable to be 
concerned that the disclosures we designed might not accurately reflect 
the kind of language and claims that actual companies report. As a result, 
Number of Correct Comprehension Questions (Out of 5)
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we also used real disclosures to test how confident respondents were in 
the efforts that companies were taking to eradicate human rights 
abuses.130   
As part of this experiment, we identified two large apparel 
companies operating in the United States that have made disclosures 
under the CTSCA. We specifically selected two companies that sell 
similar clothing and are frequently identified as direct competitors. Since 
our goal was to test whether consumers were able to identify the 
company with the better disclosure, we also specifically selected one 
company—which we refer to as “Mystery Corp.”—that has a “bad” 
disclosure and one company—that we refer to as “Anonymous Corp.”—
that has a “good” disclosure. Our categorization of the two companies 
was based on several factors including: (1) Mystery primarily relies on 
internal auditors while Anonymous uses third-party auditors; (2) 
Mystery’s audits are both announced and unannounced while those by 
Anonymous are only unannounced (within a broad window of time); and 
(3) there is no indication of the frequency of Mystery’s audits while 
those by Anonymous occur once per year. 
 For our experiment, we presented respondents with both 
disclosures.131 To avoid any ordering effects, we randomized the order 
that the disclosures were presented. After being shown both disclosures, 
the respondents were asked: “how confident do you feel that both of 
these companies are making the best effort to prevent and root out 
slavery and human trafficking in their supply chain?” They were then 
asked to rank both companies on a scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 
100 (extremely confident).  
Figure 6 presents the results of this experimental test. The 
respondents rated the statement from Mystery Corp. with an average 
score of 67.52 (90% CI: 65.90, 69.14) and the statement from 
Anonymous Corp. with an average score of 70.26 (90% CI: 68.60, 71.92). 
Although this difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (p = 
0.02), substantively it is quite small. On a scale of 0 to 100, respondents 
rated the “good” statement only three points better than the bad statement. 
This is despite the fact that the good statement exhibits more 
comprehensive supply chain due diligence, particularly its use of 
unannounced, third-party audits. As a result, although it is reassuring that 
the respondents agreed with our assessment regarding which statement is 
better, the narrow gap between the two statements suggests that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130  Although all of our respondents were presented with our primary 
experimental test, only half of our respondents were presented with this 
experimental test and half of the respondents were presented with the 
experimental test presented in the next section (Part III.D.3). This is because 
both tests asked respondents to evaluate the same set of real CTSCA disclosures.  
131 Half of the respondents were shown versions of these disclosures with the 
company’s names replaced with “Mystery” and “Anonymous”; the other half of 
the respondents were shown versions of these disclosures that included the 
company’s name. This is because our next experiment required disclosing the 
company name, and we wanted to be sure the relative responses to the 
disclosures were consistent (which they were) regardless of whether the 
consumers knew the identity of the companies.  
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consumers did not identify a dramatic difference between the two—
despite the fact that one company reported a much lower level of due 
diligence as compared to the other company.  
 
 
Figure 6: Confidence After Reading Actual Disclosures 
 
 
3. Reported Influence on Purchasing Decisions. — As previously 
noted, one of the things we would ideally like to know is whether 
consumers change their purchasing decisions as a consequence of supply 
chain disclosures. Although we are not able to directly test this with a 
survey experiment, we did try to test the effect that supply chain 
disclosures have on self-reported purchasing decisions. 
To do so, respondents that were given this experimental test 
were asked how likely they were to purchase a product from either 
Mystery Corp. or Anonymous Corp. in the next year on a scale of 0 to 
100.132 To be clear, each respondent was only asked about one company. 
After providing an answer, we then presented the respondents with the 
disclosure from the company they were asked about, and asked them 
again how likely they were to purchase a product from the company in 
the next year. This allowed us to measure whether respondents claimed 
to be more or less interested in purchasing a product from the company 
after seeing the quality of its supply chain disclosure.  
Figure 7 presents the results of this experimental test. There are 
two points worth noting about the results. First, the respondents that were 
asked about both companies claimed to be more likely to buy products 
from the companies after having been presented with the disclosures. 
What is interesting about this result, however, is that the disclosure for 
Mystery Corp. did not reveal a high level of due diligence. In other 
words, even when shown a disclosure reporting minimal efforts by a 
company to root out human rights abuses within its supply chain, the 
respodnents nevertheless had a positive reaction to the statement.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 The respondents were presented with the actual names of the companies. 
Confidence in Company's Efforts (0 = Not at All / 100 = Extremely)
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
2. Anonymous
1. Mystery
	   42	  
  7. Reported Influence on Purchasing Decisions 
 
 
 
Second, the respondents shown the Anonymous Corp. 
statement—which reports higher levels of due diligence as compared to 
the Mystery Corp. statement—did exhibit a larger increase in their stated 
willingness to buy the product after being shown the statement. 
Respondents shown the Mystery Corp. statement reported being 9 
percentage points more likely to buy a product after having read the 
statement, whereas respondents shown the Anonymous Corp. statement 
reported being 13 percentage points more likely. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (p = 0.01). This provides some 
additional evidence that respondents react more positively to supply 
chain disclosures that report higher levels of due diligence.  
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS  
 
Given the growing use of disclosure laws as a mechanism to 
hold companies accountable for human rights abuses abroad, our 
examination of the first such law aimed at consumers offers lessons for 
future policymaking and contributes to the disclosure regulation 
literature.  
A. Summary of Results 
Taken together, our experimental tests of supply chain 
disclosures produced several clear findings. The result that should be 
most reassuring for advocates of supply chain disclosure regimes is that 
respondents did consistently have the most confidence in disclosures that 
reported the highest levels of due diligence. In the primary experiment, 
the Best Practice – Optimal disclosure was rated the highest by 
respondents. In addition, in the two experimental tests where respondents 
were asked to evaluate real disclosures, the disclosure we had previously 
identified as reporting higher levels of due diligence (the “Anonymous 
Corp.” disclosure) performed better. This gives some confidence that 
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consumers may be able to interpret the relative value of supply chain 
disclosures.   
There were two other results, however, that paint a less 
optimistic picture. First, the respondents consistently rated disclosures 
that either contained no information133or reported low levels of due 
diligence134 almost as highly as disclosures that reported a high level of 
due diligence. The substantive effects of the treatments were incredibly 
small in these experimental tests, which suggests that companies may 
receive little benefit from consumers for engaging in expensive and time-
consuming due diligence.  
Second, the respondents that were presented with Best Practice 
disclosures correctly answered fewer comprehension questions. This 
suggests that the consumers may not be responding to the content of the 
disclosures, but simply responding to the fact that the Best Practice 
disclosures were longer (similarly, the Anonymous Corp. disclosure was 
slightly longer than the Mystery Corp. disclosure). If the respondents do 
not understand the content of the best practice disclosures any better, it 
may call into question the value of pushing companies to adopt these 
regimes.  
B. Limitations of Our Research 
Before discussing the implications of our research, however, it is 
important to acknowledge that our method has several limitations. First, 
it is possible that the respondents that completed our survey and 
experiment are different than the consumers that supply chain disclosures 
are directed at. This could be true if supply chain disclosures are aimed at 
communicating information to a select core of interested consumers and 
not the overall population.  
Second, the respondents that completed our survey and 
experiment were presented with information in an artificial environment. 
If consumers were to encounter supply chain disclosures while 
researching companies and products, they might behave differently than 
respondents who were presented the information during an academic 
survey.  
Third, we should note that our empirical study of the CTSCA 
does not measure the actual effectiveness of supply chain disclosure laws 
in influencing the purchasing decisions of consumers and changing 
corporate behavior. Since the law only recently went into effect, more 
time is needed before researchers can evaluate its implementation. 
Fourth, although our results provide some reasons to be 
pessimistic about consumers’ ability to interpret the information 
provided in CTSCA disclosures, those disclosures still may have an 
effect. For example, it is possible that non-profit organizations like 
KnowTheChain may be able to present the information in ways that 
consumers are better able to understand. Additionally, even if consumers 
have difficulty assessing companies’ efforts to mitigate human rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 E.g., the “General Statement” treatment in the primary experiment.  
134 E.g., the minimal disclosures in the primary experiment or the Mystery Corp. 
disclosure in the additional tests. 
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risks in corporate supply chains, the requirement to post a disclosure may 
compel companies to examine and eventually improve their practices. 
C. Implications & Agenda for Future Research 
Despite these limitations, our research suggests several important 
policy implications and directions for future research. First, our data 
suggest that simply passing a law does not ensure that companies will 
comply. Our analysis of the observational data we collected revealed that 
52% of companies fully complied with their obligation to post CTSCA 
disclosures. This suggests that if policy makers want companies to 
comply with disclosure requirements, enforcement efforts likely need to 
be strengthened in order to incentivize companies to comply. For 
example, the remedy for failure to comply with the CTSCA is an action 
brought by the Attorney General of California for injunctive relief. 
However, the Attorney General of California has thus far not brought any 
actions.135 If government officials feel that formally bringing an action 
against companies is not desirable policy, the government could 
alternatively publicly shame companies by publicizing a list of firms that 
fail to post disclosures or report on all five required topics in their 
disclosures.  
Additionally, a key finding from our experiment reveals that 
government-issued best practice guidelines may not make it easier for 
consumers to tell the difference between companies that are making 
optimal and minimal efforts to eradicate risks to human rights within 
their supply chains. In the case of the CTSCA, the Office of the 
California Attorney General issued a resource guide in 2015 that 
“intended to help covered companies by offering recommendations about 
model disclosures and best practices for developing such disclosures.”136 
According to the resource guide, companies using best practice 
disclosures are going beyond compliance to “more fully educate the 
public about the integrity of their supply chains.”137 Model disclosures 
thus aim to enhance consumers’ understanding of companies’ anti-
trafficking efforts.  
 However, our research demonstrates that the best practice 
disclosures do not in fact enhance consumers’ understanding of company 
activities. In fact, among respondents presented with Basic and Best 
Practice disclosures, there was not a statistically significant difference 
between their reactions to the Basic – Optimal disclosure and the Best 
Practice – Minimal disclosure. While consumers do care if a company 
violates human rights and are concerned about the human rights of 
employees in corporate supply chains, it appears that they may simply 
use length of disclosures as a proxy for quality. They may assume that a 
long disclosure that follows best practice recommendations necessarily 
reflects that a company is making an optimal effort to mitigate human 
rights risks within its supply chain. What may be most striking is that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
136 Cal. Dep’t of Justice Resource Guide, supra note 9, at i. 
137 Id. at 1. 
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one non-compliant disclosure, simply including a brief general statement 
of the company’s support of human rights, fared as well as the Best 
Practice – Minimal disclosure and almost as well as the Basic – Optimal 
disclosure.  This result suggests that consumers are not able to 
appropriately differentiate between the quality of the efforts a company 
is undertaking, or even whether a company is being compliant or not.  
In addition to these two issues—that is, a low level of 
compliance and the fact that the best practice guidelines do not seem to 
improve consumer understanding—our research also calls into question 
the wisdom of trusting companies to disclose information about their 
own activities. As part of our survey, we also asked respondents to rate 
how much they would trust different sources of information about a 
company’s supply chain. The results of this question are presented in 
Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8: Reported Trust in Potential Sources of Information 
 
 
 
As Figure 8 clearly shows, the source of information considered 
least trustworthy by the public is information disclosed by companies. 
This suggests that although asking companies to disclose information 
may be the cheapest form of regulation, it is also perhaps the least likely 
to improve consumer confidence (assuming that the information 
disclosed by the company is not independently verified by a third party).   
Given the limitations in the CTSCA that our research reveals, is 
there any hope in targeting human rights-related supply chain disclosures 
at consumers? Scholars have claimed that that there is in fact consumer 
demand for ethical products,138 and our research seems to support this. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 A 1999 poll by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that about 
80% of individuals said they were willing to pay more for an item if assured it 
was made under good working conditions. See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & 
RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER 
GLOBALIZATION? (2003); see also Pat Auger et al., What Will Consumers Pay 
for Social Product Features?, 42 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 281 (2003); Patrick De 
Pelsmacker et al., Do Consumers Care about Ethics? Willingness to Pay for 
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Empirical studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between 
observed sales and/or prices of goods, and their ethical characteristics.139 
For instance, a field experiment on eBay found that shoppers paid a 23% 
premium for Fair Trade labeled versus unlabeled coffees.140 Thus, there 
is evidence that some consumers have displayed a preference for 
information about the ethical practices of companies, and have used that 
information to shape their buying behavior. Given that backdrop, supply 
chain disclosure regimes provide information that a subset of consumers 
reportedly care about, as our own research demonstrates as well. 
 
Figure 9: Concern About Aspects of Products  
 
 
Figure 9 reports the results of our question that asked 
respondents how much they care about different factors when buying a 
product. Specifically, we asked respondents: “How much do you care 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fair-Trade Coffee, 39 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 361 (2005); Marsha A. Dickson, 
Utility of No Sweat Labels for Apparel Consumers: Profiling Label Users and 
Predicting Their Purchase, 35 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 96 (2001); Shareen Hertel 
et al., Human Rights and Public Opinion: From Attitudes to Action, 124 POL. 
SCI. Q. 443 (2009); Michael J. Hiscox & Nicholas F.B. Smyth, Is there 
Consumer Demand for Improved Labor Standards? Evidence from Field 
Experiments in Social Product Labeling, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820642 (2006); Maria L. Loureiro & Justus Lotade, 
Do Fair Trade and Eco-Labels in Coffee Wake Up the Consumer Conscience?, 
53 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 129 (2005); Lois A. Mohr & Deborah J. Webb, The 
Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and Price on Consumer Responses, 
39 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 121 (2005). 
139 Teisl et al. examined scanner data on U.S. retail sales of canned tuna and 
found that market share (relative to other canned seafood and meat) rose 
substantially after the introduction of the “dolphin-safe” label in April 1990. 
Mario F. Teisl et al., Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from Dolphin-
Safe Labeling, 43 J. ENVT’L ECON. & MGMT. 339 (2002). 
140 Michael J. Hiscox et al., Consumer Demand for Fair Trade: New Evidence 
from a Field Experiment Using eBay Auctions of Fresh Roasted Coffee (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811783. 
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about the following factors when buying a product?” We then asked 
respondents to rate five items on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents 
the least amount of care and 5 is a high degree of care. The respondents 
reported caring a significant amount about the price of the product and 
the quality of the product. The mean score for the price of the product is 
3.52 and the mean score for the quality of the product is 3.89. Out of the 
remaining factors, respondents reported caring most about the human 
rights of the employees making the product (the mean score is 3.13), as 
compared to the environmental impact of the product (the mean score is 
2.66) and where the product was made (the mean score is 2.47).  
 In light of potential consumer demand for human rights-related 
information on products, future research is needed to determine how 
supply chain disclosure laws can be improved. There are a variety of 
possible options that could be considered. For instance, instead of issuing 
model disclosures, governments can design and test a uniform template 
that companies would be required to use.141  A standard form could 
include a limited number of questions—for instance, “do you use 
unannounced audits?” and “do you use a third-party verifier?” A uniform 
template could aid consumer comprehension and facilitate comparison 
across companies.  
 Another option is to present disclosures at the point of sale, 
rather than rely on consumers to seek out the information on corporate 
websites. These types of disclosures, referred to as “targeted 
transparency,” mandate information at the time of decision-making in 
order to “nudge” consumer behavior. 142  Targeted disclosures may 
necessitate a rating system whereby the government or a third party 
converts disclosed information into a grade or label (e.g., a trafficking-
free label) that is presented to consumers at the time of purchasing.143 
This information could also be available to consumers through apps, 
several of which already provide information on companies’ ethical 
practices.144 In fact, the G7 recently released a statement in support of 
responsible supply chains that calls for the development of “impartial 
tools [such as relevant apps] to help consumers and public procurers . . . 
compare information on the validity and credibility of social and 
environmental product labels.”145  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 404. 
142 See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEL, supra note 14; RICHARD M. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS (2008). 
143 For an analysis of rating systems based on an empirical study of restaurant 
sanitation grading, see Ho, supra note 14.  
144 Existing apps that monitor human rights within corporate supply chains 
include Free2Work (www.free2work.org), GoodGuide (www.goodguide.com), 
and Slavery Footprint (www.slaveryfootprint.org).  
145  G-7 Leaders’ Declaration in Schloss Emau, Germany (June 8, 2015), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/08/g-7-
leaders-declaration. 
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 In considering whether to add a labeling requirement to 
disclosure laws, policymakers need to tread carefully given the D.C. 
Circuit Court’s recent conflict minerals ruling. In August 2015, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the labeling 
requirement in section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (whereby companies 
must report on whether or not their products are “conflict-free”) was 
considered “compelled speech” in violation of the First Amendment. 146  
The ruling, however, upheld the remainder of the disclosure 
requirements within the conflict minerals due diligence and reporting 
regime.  
Governments can also develop and release a list of “slave-free” 
companies or “dirty” companies, which could influence not only 
consumers but also governments’ own contracting decisions. A similar 
mechanism has been used by the Brazilian government, which updates a 
“dirty list” of companies that use slave labor.147 Firms on this list pay a 
series of fines and cannot obtain credit from the government or private 
banks.148 They are also boycotted by those who have signed up to a 
National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labor.149 Companies on the 
“dirty list” have two years to clean up their supply chains before being 
given the opportunity to get off the list.  
Finally, it may be worth entirely reconsidering the wisdom of 
trying to reduce slavery and human trafficking through the use of 
mandatory disclosure regimes. As previously noted, research in other 
areas has questioned the value of disclosure regimes.150 Our research 
suggests that, although consumers may care about human rights, it is not 
clear that supply chain disclosures will help them make more informed 
decisions. After all, simply posting information about supply chain audits 
on company websites does not necessarily lead to changes in consumer 
behavior.   
The one thing that is clear from our study is that further research 
is needed to test the effectiveness of these options before designing 
future supply chain regulations. Disclosure requirements and best 
practice guidelines should be drafted based on empirical evidence of 
what would most effectively communicate relevant information to 
consumers. It is important to keep in mind that providing more 
information may have the unintended consequence of inhibiting 
consumer comprehension. In addition, given the difficulty of interpreting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., No. 13-5252, 2015 WL 5089667 (D.C. Cir. 
Aug. 18, 2015).	  
147  See Annie Kelly, Brazil's “Dirty List” Names and Shames Companies 
Involved in Slave Labour, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/brazil-dirty-list-names-
shames-slave-labour. 
148 Id. 
149 See INT’L LABOR ORG., NATIONAL PACT FOR THE ERADICATION OF SLAVE 
LABOR (2005), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
dgreports/---ilo-washington/documents/genericdocument/wcms_189835.pdf. 
150 See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13. 
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human rights disclosures, more research is also needed on: (1) which 
factors (e.g., a company’s industry, the country in which it operates, or 
the number of its suppliers) have the largest impact on the risk of human 
rights violations in corporate supply chains; (2) the relationship between 
these factors and actual human rights outcomes; (3) which aspects of due 
diligence are most likely to minimize potential human rights risks; and 
(4) the likelihood that such information would in fact shape consumer 
purchasing decisions in the field. Such research is necessary before more 
countries follow in the steps of the United Kingdom in passing supply 
chain disclosure laws that model the flawed CTSCA.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In response to growing concern over corporate complicity in 
human rights abuses, laws have been adopted—and are currently being 
proposed—that require companies to disclose their efforts to mitigate 
human rights risks in their supply chains. To date, however, these laws 
have been subject to little empirical scrutiny. In this paper, we argued 
that the effectiveness of supply chain disclosure regimes is likely to be 
limited. This is not only because disclosure regimes in other contexts 
have been shown to be frequently ineffective, but also because unique 
features of supply chain disclosures make them especially difficult to 
interpret. In order to test our argument, we engaged a leading market 
research firm to recruit a nationally representative sample of respondents 
to complete a series of experimental tests designed to measure consumers’ 
confidence and comprehension of supply chain disclosures. Although 
there were some positive findings for advocates of supply chain 
disclosure regimes, the respondents consistently rated disclosures 
reporting low levels of due diligence almost as highly as disclosures that 
reported a high level of due diligence. In other words, our experimental 
results are broadly consistent with our theory.  
We believe that the evidence presented in this study suggests that 
it may be time to reconsider the design of current supply chain disclosure 
laws, especially given the recently passed U.K. law modeled after the 
CTSCA and current efforts to pass similar laws on the federal level and 
in Australia.151 Although consumers may be interested in whether a 
company’s supply chain is free from human rights abuses, current 
corporate disclosures do not help consumers determine which companies 
are making comprehensive efforts to achieve that goal. Taken together, 
our results thus suggest that the current disclosure regimes have serious 
limitations. Although the goal of improving corporate human rights 
practices is admirable, the current disclosure regimes are not a well-
designed way to achieve it. 
  
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See sources cited supra note 10. 
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Appendix A – Text of the Experimental Treatments 
 
1. General Statement 
 
Our company is committed to respecting the human rights of our 
employees.  Our Code of Ethics and company policies adhere to the 
principles of free choice  of employment, nondiscrimination, and humane 
treatment. We ensure compliance with regulations governing child labor, 
minimum wage, and maximum working hour limitations. 
 
2. Basic – Optimal Disclosure 
 
Verification 
We conduct assessments of all of our direct suppliers once a year to 
verify that they are not at risk for violating anti-slavery and human 
trafficking laws. Third party auditors spearhead the verification process 
using a multi-level process to identify and evaluate potential risks. 
   
Supplier Audits 
Third party auditors conduct unannounced audits of all of our direct 
suppliers once a year to evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery 
and human trafficking company standards. 
  
Certification 
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-
slavery and human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which 
they do business. 
  
Internal Accountability 
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for 
employees and contractors failing to meet our company standards 
regarding slavery and trafficking. If and when our company uncovers 
employee or contractor compliance problems, we provide written notice 
and a specified period of time to take corrective action. Failure to take 
action results in termination of the relationship. 
  
Training 
Our company provides employees with training on mitigating the risks of 
human trafficking and slavery within our company’s supply chains of 
products.  
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3. Basic – Minimal Disclosure 
 
 Verification 
We conduct assessments of a sample of our direct suppliers to verify that 
they are not at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws. 
Our internal auditors spearhead the verification process using a multi-
level process to identify and evaluate potential risks. 
  
Supplier Audits 
Our internal auditors conduct announced audits of a sample of our direct 
suppliers to evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery and human 
trafficking company standards. 
  
Certification 
We request our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-
slavery and human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which 
they do business. 
  
Internal Accountability 
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for 
employees and contractors failing to meet our company standards 
regarding slavery and trafficking. If and when our company uncovers 
employee or contractor compliance problems, we provide written notice 
and suggest corrective actions.  
  
Training 
Our company provides employees with training on the importance of 
respecting the human rights.  
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4. Best Practice  – Optimal Disclosure 
 
Verification 
We conduct assessments of all of our direct suppliers twice a year to 
verify that they are not at risk for violating anti-slavery and human 
trafficking laws. Third party auditors spearhead the verification process 
using a multi-level process to identify and evaluate potential risks. Prior 
to partnering with any new suppliers, and twice a year thereafter, our 
monitor conducts an initial screening of those suppliers. During the next 
level of review, our monitor requires prospective and current suppliers to 
respond in writing to questions regarding areas of concern raised during 
the initial screening process. The monitor then assesses which suppliers 
pose the highest risk in human trafficking, and reports these findings to 
our executive management team. 
 
  
Supplier Audits 
Third party auditors conduct unannounced audits of all of our direct 
suppliers twice a year to evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery 
and human trafficking company standards. Audits consist of individual 
and group interviews with supervisors and management, as well as 
exhaustive facility tours. We monitor supplier behavior and compliance 
through the use of a professional third-party auditing firm, which 
performs extensive unannounced investigations. 
 
  
Certification 
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-
slavery and human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which 
they do business. Our partners must produce records to our company. 
Such records include: (1) proof of age for every worker; (2) every 
employee’s payroll records and timesheets; (3) written documentation of 
terms and conditions of employment; (4) local health and safety 
evaluations or documentation of exemption from law; and (5) records of 
employee grievances and suggestions, and any employer responses. 
  
Internal Accountability 
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for 
employees and contractors failing to meet our company standards 
regarding slavery and trafficking. In the last year, our team conducted 
visits to all of our supplier factories to audit internal grievance 
mechanisms. We evaluated the existing communication channels in these 
factories and assessed their adequacy, reviewing the frequency of 
grievances reported and resolved. Auditors work with employees and 
contractors to develop action plans to resolve any such instances of non-
compliance. If and when our company uncovers employee or contractor 
compliance problems, we provide written notice and a specified period 
of time to take corrective action. Failure to take action results in 
termination of the relationship. 
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Training 
Our company provides employees with training on mitigating the risks of 
human trafficking and slavery within our company’s supply chains of 
products. Last summer, we conducted a three-day annual seminar for our 
employees and managers who are directly responsible for selecting and 
overseeing our suppliers. Our supply chain management staff consists of 
two vice-presidents and one operations manager.  
  
  
5. Best Practice  – Minimal Disclosure 
 
Verification 
We conduct assessments of a sample of our direct suppliers to verify that 
they are not at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws. 
Our internal auditors spearhead the verification process using a multi-
level process to identify and evaluate potential risks. Prior to partnering 
with any new suppliers, our monitor conducts an initial screening of 
those suppliers. During the next level of review, our monitor requests 
prospective and current suppliers to respond in writing to questions 
regarding areas of concern raised during the initial screening process. 
The monitor then assesses which suppliers pose the highest risk in 
human trafficking, and reports these findings to our executive 
management team. 
  
Supplier Audits 
Our internal auditors conduct announced audits of a sample of our direct 
suppliers to evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery and human 
trafficking company standards. Audits consist of individual and group 
interviews with supervisors and management, as well as exhaustive 
facility tours. We monitor supplier behavior and compliance through the 
use of our own internal auditing team, which performs announced 
investigations. 
  
Certification 
We request our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-
slavery and human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which 
they do business. Our partners are asked to produce records to our 
company. Such records include: (1) proof of age for every worker; (2) 
every employee’s payroll records and timesheets; (3) written 
documentation of terms and conditions of employment; (4) local health 
and safety evaluations or documentation of exemption from law; and (5) 
records of employee grievances and suggestions, and any employer 
responses. 
  
Internal Accountability 
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for 
employees and contractors failing to meet our company standards 
regarding slavery and trafficking. Our team has conducted visits to a 
sample of our supplier factories to audit internal grievance mechanisms. 
We evaluated the existing communication channels in these factories and 
assessed their adequacy, reviewing the frequency of grievances reported 
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and resolved. Auditors work with employees and contractors to develop 
action plans to resolve any such instances of non-compliance. If and 
when our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance 
problems, we provide written notice and suggest corrective actions.  
  
Training 
Our company provides employees with training on the importance of 
respecting the human rights. Last summer, we conducted a one-day 
annual seminar for our employees and managers who are directly 
responsible for selecting and overseeing our suppliers.  
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Appendix B – Tables of the Results from the Experiments   
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Mean Responses and 95% Confidence Intervals  
General 
Statement 
Basic 
 – Optimal 
Disclosure 
Basic 
 – Minimal 
Disclosure 
Best Practice 
 – Optimal 
Disclosure 
Best Practice 
– Minimal 
Disclosure 
67.04 69.73 65.06 75.16 66.84 
(64.53, 69.55) (67.14, 72.33) (62.14, 67.99) (72.87, 77.46) (64.23, 69.44) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Mean Responses and 95% Confidence Intervals  
General 
Statement 
Basic 
 – Optimal 
Disclosure 
Basic 
 – Minimal 
Disclosure 
Best Practice 
 – Optimal 
Disclosure 
Best Practice 
– Minimal 
Disclosure 
2.88 2.39 1.80 1.87 1.54 
(2.70, 3.06) (2.25, 2.53) (1.67, 1.93) (1.76, 1.97) (1.43, 1.65) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Mean Responses and 95% Confidence Intervals  
Mystery 
Corp. 
Anonymous 
Corp. 
67.52 70.26 
(65.90, 69.14) (68.60, 71.92) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Mean Responses and 95% Confidence Intervals  
Mystery 
Corp.  
-- 
Before 
Mystery 
Corp. 
-- 
After 
Anonymous 
Corp. 
-- 
Before 
Anonymous 
Corp.  
-- 
After 
40.66 49.58 32.27 45.17 
(37.44, 43.88) (46.37, 52.79) (29.05, 35.50) (41.77, 48.57) 
 
 
